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Uniform Support Legislation
By JoHN W. MuEPHY, JR.*
Family desertion and non-support is a serious social and legal
problem. Whenever a husband or father leaves his home and fails
to discharge the fundamental duty of supporting his wife and children,
a whole family unit is disrupted and the duty of support is transferred
to friends, relatives or to the welfare agencies of the state and federal
government. Wives are often unable to support themselves and must
look to the welfare agencies for assistance and guidance. Children
abandoned by parents are frequently committed to orphanages.' The
number of persons receiving aid from public welfare because of the
delinquency of persons responsible for their support is astounding.2
The number of dependent children in receipt of public aid in the
United States has increased by over one-half million since 1941 and
payments have increased nearly four hundred million dollars.3 For
the period January 1951, to September 1953, an average monthly total
of nearly 55,000 dependent children received a total of nearly $36,-
000,000 from the Public Welfare Fund of the state of Kentucky alone.
4
These appalling figures, coupled with the fact that they do not include
the numerous cases of non-support which are not recorded because
dependents do not apply for public assistance, indicate that the prob-
lem of deserting fathers and husbands is indeed oppressive.
* BS., Eastern Kentucky State College; LL.B., University of Kentucky. Mem-
ber of Kentucky Bar. Past Associate Editor and Business Manager of Kentucky
Law Journal.
'It was estimated by the National Desertion Bureau that over 25% of the
children in orphanges in the United States as public charges were not orphans,
but deserted children. Zuner, Family Desertion: Some International Aspects of the
Problem, 6 Soc. SEvRcE REv. 2 (1932).
'The Social Security Administration in a study made in sixteen states has
estimated that among families assisted under the program for aid to dependent
children, the number of fathers deserting or separated without court decree in-
creased by 25% between the years of 1942 and 1948. It was shown also that the
father's absence from home outranked death and incapacity as the reason for the
children's need for public assistance. Aid to Dependent Children in a Postwar
Year, PUBLIC AssIsTANcE REPORT No. 17, Federal Security Agency (1949).
'The exact figures show an increase of from 941,000 in 1941 to 1,528,000 in
1951 and an increase in payments of from $153,000,000 in 1941 to $553,000,000
in 1941 to $558,000,000 in 1951. Federal Security Agency, SocL. SEcuarry BuL-
LETin (Sept., 1952). The statistics of the Fed. Security Agency show an annual
increase of 20% in payments to dependent wives and children. ANNuAL REPoRT
oF FEDmL SEcuarT AGENCY, Social Security Admin. for 1947, 1948, 1949.
'A recent survey indicates that approximately 10.3% of the children are
dependent due to the father's desertion. Figures were supplied by Gerald B.
Johnson, Jr., Attorney for Department of Economic Security at Frankfort, Ky. in
answer to a request by this writer.
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It was in the light of this burden on taxpayers, caused by runaway
husbands and fathers, who had made members of their families public
charges by refusing to support them, that the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform De-
sertion and Non-Support Act and the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act for the purpose of impeding the increase of
desertion and non-support. The New York Legislature promulgated
the Uniform Support of Dependents Act for the same reason. These
Uniform Acts are in effect in forty-six states and four territories. The
purpose of this article is to evaluate the effect of each of these Acts
on the problem of desertion and non-support. The three Uniform
Acts are discussed in chronological sequence.
I. Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act 5
In 1910, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved the Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act
and recommended it for adoption as a uniform law in all the states
and territories. The National Conference credits the Act with adoption
in twenty-four states and territories. 6 However, a cursory examination
of these state statutes indicates a conspicuous lack of uniformity, due
to the fact that no state adopted the Act exactly as proposed and
many states made changes by subsequent amendments. The Act has
been adopted with many modifications and some improvements, some
states creating many new duties unknown at common law.
Constitutionality. The Act was first held constitutional by the"
Kansas Supreme Court against the contention that the maximum pen-
alty of imprisonment at hard labor for two years violated the consti-
tutional prohibition against cruel and inhuman punishment,7 and later
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, upholding a conviction
under the Act as not in violation of the provision against slavery and
involuntary servitude.8 Although some of the provisions of the Act
may be held invalid, this does not affect its other provisions nor render
it unconstitutional in its entirety.9 It has been held in some jurisdic-
tions that a former act was repealed by adoption of the Uniform Act
although it was not technically inconsistent therewith. The Vermont
Supreme Court in so holding said:
-10 U. L. A. (1922).
'10 U. L. A. (1952 Supp.).
'State v. Gillmore, 88 Kan. 835, 129 Pac. 1123 (1913).
'Com. v. Pouliot, 292 Mass. 229, 198 N. E. 256 (1935). See also: Furlow
v. State, 78 Tex. Crim. 544, 182 S. W. 308 (1916); Fisher v. Sommerville, 83
W. Va. 160, 98 S. E. 67 (1919).
" State v. Blackwell, 16 Ala. App. 500, 79 So. 198 (1918).
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We may take judicial notice that the Act of 1915 was one prepared
and recommended by the national conference of commissioners on
uniform state laws, and that at the time of its adoption by the Legis-
lature of this state it had already been adopted by several of the
other states. . . . It would do violence to the expressed intention of
the Legislature to promote uniformity of law on the subject to pre-
sume that they intended to defeat that purpose by retaining a statute
which would create dissimilarity.'
On the other band, it has been asserted, notwithstanding the objective
of the Commissioners to promote uniformity that an earlier act was
not repealed by implication."
Although the Act is not retroactive to include offenses committed
before its adoption, a party affected may be convicted for non-support
if the offense continues after the passage of the Act.'
2
Criminal Sanctions and Penalties. The Uniform Act provides in
Section 1 that any person who wilfully deserts or neglects to provide
for the support of a wife or child under sixteen years of age, leaving
the dependent in destitute circumstances, shall be punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both.' 3 The section is carefully drafted and re-
quires the presence of many elements for conviction. Only one state
adopted Section 1 without change. Many of the states reworded the
language to comply with their existing support laws and other states
added provisions enlarging its scope.
It will be noted that the Act makes it a crime for a husband or
parent to wilfully desert his wife or children but is silent as to whether
the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor.
14
Since the offense is a crime under the statute, the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 5 but one court
in affirming a conviction under weak evidence said:
It ought not require much evidence to support a judgment which does
not punish the defendant for any found past delinquency, but only
requires him, an able-bodied man 80 years of age, to pay in the future
$5.00 a week to his wife and child, for their support and maintenance,
'°Ex parte Turner, 92 Vt. 210, 216, 102 At. 948, 946 (1918). See also:
People v. Ankrum, 286 Ill. 819, 121 N. E. 579 (1919).
"State v. Garris, 98 N. J. L. 608, 121 Ad. 292 (1928)
"Wynn v. State, 18 Ala. App. 397, 92 So. 520 (1922).
" 10 U. L. A. sec. 1 (1922).
' Of the twenty-four jurisdictions which have adopted the Act, fourteen
declare it to be a misdemeanor, two a felony, and eight have merely adopted the
Act as it was promulgated, declaring the offense to be a "crime." 10 U. L. A. 1-10
(1922) and (1952 Supp.). Those two states which have declared the offense to
be a felony have been careful to include all the elements necessary for the com-
mission of a felony so that the Act will not be rendered unconstitutional for
failure to do so. The Mississippi Act was held invalid in that it made the offense
of desertion and non-support a felony and permitted prosecution other than by
indictment. State v. Sansome. 183 Miss. 428, 97 So. 753 (1928).
"State v. Heath, 224 Iowa 483, 276 N. W. 35 (1938); People v. Parks, 216
Ill. App. 529 (1920).
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and who, for the period alleged in the information, more than a year,
had, as shown by the evidence, contributed but $15.00 towards their
support.
1 '
Defenses and Justifications. A desertion must be "without just
cause" or "wilful" and failure to support children must be "without
lawful excuse" or "wilful." While these phrases may seem to be vague,
the courts have had little trouble in determining whether or not the
offense is one that is punishable under the Act. The word "wilful" has
been held to mean not only with evil intent and malice but also with a
set purpose and design. Before the accused can be justified in desert-
ing his wife he must have had a lawful reason.' 7 Actual desertion is
not necessary, since the offense of desertion and non-support are two
separate offenses, and even though the husband may continue to live
with his wife he may be guilty of violating the Act if he neglects or
refuses to provide for her support. 8 The fact that the wife- deserted
her husband without just cause has been held to be a good defense
to a prosecution under the Act,'9 and if she refuses to follow him to
a new abode or to another community where he goes to seek employ-
ment or higher wages, there is no wilful desertion.20 If a wife leaves
the matrimonial domicile because of the husband's cruel treatment,
her leaving does not constitute just cause for his failure to support
her.
21
As to failure to provide for the support of a child, it is no defense
that the wife who has custody of the child, refused to live with the
husband.22 However, where the wife without good reason refuses to
live with the husband at the residence established by him, he is not
liable for the support of his children. As the Virginia Supreme Court
said:
His duty to support them is based largely upon his right to their
custody and control. To say the least of it, he has the right at common
law to maintain them in his own home, and he cannot be compelled
against his will to do so elsewhere, unless he has refused or failed to
provide for them where he lives....
The statute under which this prosecution was instituted
was not intended to change the common law, with respect to the duty
State v. Smith, 45 Utah 881, 146 Pac. 286 (1915).
1 7Mercardo v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 559, 218 S. W. 491 (1920).
Bobo v. State, 90 Tex. Grim. 397, 285 S. W. 878 (1921).
People v. Parks, 216 Ill. App. 529 (1920); Verse v. State, 81 Tex. Grim. 48,
193 S. W. 803 (1917). Supra, note 18.
o This is true even though the wife claims to have a valid excuse for not fol-
lowing him. Reid v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 65, 229 S. W. 824 (1921); Mikeska v.
State, 88 Tex. Crim. 504, 228 S. W. 235 (1921); Green v. State 84 Tex. Crim.
151, 206 S. W. 93 (1918).
'State v. Sharp, 31 Del. 148, 111 Ad. 909 (1920). However if the wife
offers to return, a refusal by the husband to receive her back renders him liable
for her support and maintenance.
"State v. Nelson, 31 Del. 436, 114 Adt. 863 (1921); People v. Howell, 214
Ill. App. 372 (1919); Adams v. State, 164 Wis. 223, 159 N. W. 726 (1916).
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of a father to maintain and support his infant children, but merely to
more effectually enforce the legal duty."
One court has held, rightly, that the offense of failing to provide for
the maintenance of a wife and failing to support a child are two sep-
arate offenses and that if the husband offered to support them if his
wife would live with him or to provide separately for their support,
there could be no conviction for a failure to support the child.
24
The financial inability of a father to support a child is a valid de-
fense to a prosecution under the Act, and it is immaterial whether
the inability is by reason of illness, poverty, or physical inability to
work.25 However, he must show that he has done all that he reason-
ably can towards their support, and it is his duty to seek employment
even though it be different from his usual occupation.26 It has also
been held, where the accused was out of work part of the time and
could afford to support only those children awarded him by a divorce
decree, that a failure to provide for the support of his other children
was not an offense punishable under the Act, the court saying that
it was his first duty to support those children in his custody.27 How-
ever, the mere fact that a divorce decree gave custody of the children
to the wife does not prevent a prosecution of the husband for failure
to support them.
28
In a prosecution under the Act it must be shown that the husband
or father deserted his wife or child in "destitute or necessitous circum-
stances." It is not necessary that they be left in dire poverty, but it
must appear that they are substantially destitute or without means
of securing the reasonable necessities of life. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court in construing this element of the Act held that it is not necessary
... that a wife must strip herself of all ornaments, such as her en-
gagement ring and other jewelry of small value, or of her piano, and
much less of necessary household furniture, before she can be con-
sidered in necessitous circumstances .... A wife is in necessitous cir-
cumstances, within the meaning of the statute, when she does not
have property or money available for such necessities or ordinary
comforts of life as her husband can reasonably furnish, even though
she has the clothing, furniture, and ornaments usually owned by a
woman in her station in life, or receives aid from others.'
Although a strict construction of the statute results in holding that
the wife or children must be left in "destitute and necessitous circum-
SButler v. Com., 132 Va. 609, 610, 110 S. E. 868, 869 (1922).
' Sims v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 469, 239 S. W. 974 (1922).
"Flowers v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 293, 221 S. W. 289 (1920). See cases cited
therein for further examples.
' State v. Nelson, supra note 22.
' State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 Pac. 829 (1913).
'People v. Baker, 222 Ill. App. 451 (1921); Watke v. State, 166 Wis. 41,
163 N. W. 258 (1917).
Brandel v. State, 161 Wis. 532, 533, 154 N. W. 997, 997-998 (1915).
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stances" at the time of the desertion, their status at that time should
not be controlling since a husband might leave them with sufficient
means for support for only a limited time, and yet not be liable for
desertion under the statute.30 Also, it is to be noted that since there
may be non-support without desertion, in such an instance a strict
construction of the statute should not be applied.31
The husband cannot escape prosecution under the Act for wilfully
failing to provide for support of his family by showing that such sup-
port is being supplied by friends, relatives or charitable institutions,
since his duty is independent of the means or ability which they
possess to support themselves.3 2 The very essence of the Act is that
a husband or father should not be allowed to shift the burden of sup-
porting his family upon others who are under no obligation to bear it.
However, where the support of a child has been legally assumed by
some third person the father is not liable for its support and cannot
be convicted for failure to do so, e.g., where the parents are divorced,
the mother remarried and the child is being supported by the step-
father as a member of the family.
33
Procedure, Jurisdiction and Venue. Section 2 of the Act provides
that proceedings may be instituted upon complaint by oath or affirma-
tion by the wife, child, or any other person against the deserting
father or husband.3 4 Of the twenty-four jurisdictions which have
adopted the Act, ten omitted this section and most of the remaining
' Kachel v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 86, 256 S. W. 263 (1923). Many states take
the view that the mere fact that the husband only deserts the dependents does
not subject him to criminal liability and that it is only when he fails to provide for
their support that a crime is committed. Green v. State, 96 Ark. 175, 131 S. W.
463 (1910); State v. Bailey, 115 Ore. 428, 236 P. 1053 (1925); Ex parte Strong,
95 Tex. Grim. 250, 252 S. W. 767 (1928). But of. Murphy v. State, 171 Ark. 620,
286 S. W. 871 (1926) where the court held that wilful desertion of a wife without
good cause may be made a criminal offense although it is not accompanied by
failure to support. The Act as originally enacted provided for punishment for
"desertion andnon-support" but was later amended to "desertion or non-support"
in order to cure the earlier defect. See Supra, note 18.
"I One court has gone so far as to hold that where the husband deserted his
wife, leaving her with only three days provisions, she was not left in destitute and
necessitious circumstances because he had left her all the furniture they had
accumulated, which she had sold and appropriated the proceeds therefrom.
Wallace'v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 91, 210 S. W. 206 (1919). However, in a case
where the husband deeded a lot worth $700 and a home worth $1200 and left
the wife with $300 in cash, the court rightfully held that she was not left in
destitute and necessitious circumstances even though she had spent the money
left her, because she had a place where she could live which was sufficiently fur-
nished for her comfort. Furlow v. State, 78 Tex. Grim. 544, 182 S. W. 808 (1916).
See also: Barrow v. State, 88 Tex. Grim. 82, 225 S. W. 53 (1920); Hood v. State,
87 Tex. Grim. 222, 220 S. W. 550 (1920).
'State v. Weldin, 8 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 158, 189 At. 586 (1937); People v.
Howell. 214 Ill. App. 372 (1913); Huntley v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. 530, 266 S. W.
505 (1924); State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136 Pac. 215 (1913).
"State v. Constable, 90 W. Va. 515, 112 S. E. 410 (1922). But of. Pope v.
State, 123 Tex. Crim. 576, 59 S. W. 2d 390 (1933).
' 10 U. L. A. sec. 2 (1922).
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fourteen modified it to conform to their existing law. Many states
have added provisions pertaining to the duties of various public offi-
cials, the procedure to be followed, jurisdiction of the various courts
and the rights of both parties.
Although the Act makes no provision for procedure or venue, the
courts have generally followed existing practice relating to procedure
in criminal cases. Further resort may be had to the constitutions, the
common law and general statutes in determining the procedure to
be followed.35 Some of the states adopting the Act have drafted a
form of complaint to be used. All that the complaint should state is
(1) that the desertion was wilful or without just cause, (2) the names
of the parties deserted, (8) their age (if children), (4) the existence
of a marital relationship (if a wife), (5) that the dependents were
left in destitute circumstances, and (6) the place of the desertion
and the date of such desertion.
Where the accused is arrested and brought into court on a com-
plaint there are two courses open. First, the state may give him a
preliminary hearing, and if there is reasonable ground for establishing
his guilt, he may be required to post bail to answer any indictment.
Upon default of, bail he may be committed as in other criminal pro-
ceedings but he cannot be tried for the offense except on presentment
or indictment. Second, the complainant may give notice and file her
petition for support pending prosecution and the defendant may make
any defense to show that he is not liable for the support of those named
in the petition.
3
Although a husband who was a resident of another state at the
time the Act went into effect cannot be convicted, a deserting husband
who goes into another state is subject to prosecution in the jurisdiction
where the wife remained.37 Where the husband and wife have been
domiciled in one state and the husband constructively deserts the
wife, causing her to take the children and go into another state where
they become destitute, the husband is answerable for their support
regardless of the state of his residence. 8 The mere fact that the hus-
band was out of the state between the dates alleged in an indictment
for the non-support of his wife constitutes no defense. 39 In order for
a wife outside the state to secure support, she must show that the
" Donaghy v. State, 6 Boyce (Del.) 467, 100 Ati. 696 (1917); Fisher v. Som-
merville, 83 W. Va. 160, 98 S. E. 67 (1919).
' State v. Goudy, 94 W. Va. 542, 119 S. E. 685 (1923).
' People v. Herrick, 200 Ill. App. 428 (1916); State v. Gillmore, 88 Kan. 835,
129 Pae. 1123 (1913).
1 Alfred v. State, 28 Okla. Crim. 13, 228 Pac. 788 (1924); State v. Weliman,
102 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052 (1918). See also: In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131
Pac. 598 (1913).
Commonwealth v. Booth, 266 Mass. 80, 165 N. E. 29 (1929).
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support was due in the state where the action is brought, i.e.; she must
show that she came or was willing to come into the state for support
and that she took steps to obtain it from him after she learned that
he was in the state. She cannot come from her resident state into the
state where the husband is and charge him for non-support in that
state unless she proves an express demand for support, or other cir-
cumstances from which it can be implied that the husband had knowl-
edge that she was in the state and in need of support.40
Support Pendento Lite. Section 8 of the Uniform Act provides for
support of dependents pendente lite, enforceable by contempt pro-
ceedings.41 Of the twenty-four states which have adopted the Act,
nine omitted this section and the greater part of those which adopted
it have modified it by adding other provisions. It is usually held that
to sustain an order for support pondente lite, the same elements and
circumstances must be shown as would sustain a finding of non-support
under Section 1.42
The failure of the husband to comply with the order is civil and
not criminal contempt since the provisions of the Act are primarily
for the benefit of the wife and not the public.43 Usually a petition
charging contempt in violation of an order for support pendente lite
must be verified or supported by an affidavit of the complainant, but
where the contempt was committed in the presence of the court by
failure to obey the order to make immediate payment, the court has
jurisdiction to deal with such contempt without further complaint.44
Probation and Suspension. Section 4 of the Uniform Act provides
that before the trial (with the defendant's consent), or at the trial (if
he pleads guilty), or after conviction, the court may order the de-
fendant to make periodic payments to his dependents and may release
him from custody upon probation. Such an order is conditioned upon
his compliance with the order of support and is subject to modifica-
tion in the discretion of the court.45 Of those states adopting the Act,
two omitted this section and the others modified and amended it so
drastically that it would hardly be recognized as part of the original
Uniform Act.
While such a provision can probably be found in the statutes of
those states which have not adopted the Uniform Act, there has been
People v. Higgins, 109 Misc. 328, 178 N. Y. S. 728 (1919).
4110 U. L. A. sec. 3 (1922).
"People v. Anknun, 286 Ill. 319, 121 N. E. 579 (1919).
"State v. Chaff-man, 15 N. J. Super. 492, 83 A. 2d 643 (1951); People v.
Elbert, 287 Ill. 458, 122 N. E. 816 (1919).
"Petition of Kelley, 292 Mass. 178, 197 N. E. 861 (1935); Ex parte Sturrock,
80 Tex. Crim. 307, 189 S. W. 487 (1916).
" 10 U. L. A. sec. 4 (1922).
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some question raised as to the validity of the provision in that the
power to suspend sentence encroaches on the pardoning power of
the executive department of the state.46 This section of the Act has
been held to confer no power to change or commute a sentence of
imprisonment once it has been imposed, since the words "after con-
viction" are to be read as meaning after conviction and before pro-
nouncement of sentence. It was held that the Act gives only three
distinct powers to the court: (1) it may impose a fine, (2) it may
require the defendant to enter into a recognizance to pay a certain
sum weekly to the wife, in which case he will be released from cus-
tody, or (3) it may sentence the defendant to the county jail and
direct that such imprisonment be worked out in hard labor. The court
may choose any three of the alternatives but has no power to commute
a sentence of imprisonment once it has been imposed.
47
Non-Compliance with Court's Order. Section 5 of the Act provides
for arrest, hearing, forfeiture of bond, modification of the order for
maintenance or the imposition of a penalty upon failure to comply
with the original order of support. In case of forfeiture of bond, pay-
ment of any part or all of it is made to the wife or children.48 (The
Act is unique in that it allows payment of the bond forfeiture to the
deserted wife or children.) Five states which adopted the Act omitted
this section and only seven appear to have adopted it without any
notable change. The real purpose of this provision is to make Section
4 of the Act more effective in that it gives the court power to proceed
with the trial and impose sentence under the original conviction, or
to enforce the suspended sentence, if the defendant violates the order
of support or the probation provisions of that section.
Non-Privileged Witnesses. Section 6 of the Act qualifies the ordi-
nary rules of evidence and makes the husband or wife a competent
witness against the other, except that neither can be compelled to give
incriminating evidence against himself. The section further provides
that proof of desertion of the wife or child in destitute circumstances
or failure to provide for their support shall be prima facie evidence
that such desertion or non-support is wilful.49 Only three states omit-
'"State v. Murphy, 207 Ala. 290, 92 So. 661 (1922). One State instead of
adopting the provisions as to payment of support pendente lite imposed a fine on
the defendant and made the fine payable to the deserted wife. This provision was
upheld against an attack that it rendered the act void for diversion of a fine from
the direction required in the Constitution, the court saving that it was doubtful
whether anyone but the state had an interest sufficient to question the disposition
of a fine since it was public money. Postelwait v. State, 28 Okla. Crim. 17, 228
Pac. 789 (1928). See also: State v. Gillmore, 88 Kan. 835, 129 Pac. 1123 (1913).
' State v. Superior Court, 79 Wash. 570, 140 Pac. 555 (1914).
410 U. L. A. sec. 5 (1922).
10 U. L. A. see. 6 (1922).
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ted the first provision of this section in adopting the Act. It is be-
lieved that their reason for so doing was that their statutes already
had the same or similar provision. Four states omitted the last pro-
vision of this section. The entire section has been upheld as being a
valid exercise of the legislative power to establish rules of evidence.50
Although the section provides that proof of neglect shall be prima
facie evidence that such neglect was wilful, no proof of a demand for
support is necessary and the burden is still on the state to prove that
the deserted wife or child was left in destitute circumstances. It is
not sufficient to prove only desertion or abandonment since that pre-
sumption is rebuttable.51
Miscellaneous Provisions. Section 7 of the Act provides for the
payment of an undetermined amount of compensation for each day
of hard labor performed by the convicted person while imprisoned.
52
Twelve of the states which adopted the Act omitted this section and
those which included it set the amount from forty to fifty cents per
day to be paid out of the general fund of the state. A few states have
graduated the amount according to the number of dependents.
Section 8 provides that the Act shall be interpreted to effect its
general purpose to make uniform the laws of the states which enact it.
Section 9 is the repealing clause, although six states did not adopt it,
and Section 10 is the effective date clause.
Evaluation. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the Uniform
Desertion and Non-Support Act is anything but uniform in the states
which have adopted it. This lack of uniformity is due to the fact that
none of the states adopted the Act exactly as it was promulgated, and
thirteen have amended the statute since their original enactment.
Further departure from uniformity is evidenced by judicial construc-
tion in the adopting jurisdictions in that opposite results are often
reached as to interpretations of the same provision. Uniformity of
"the judge made law" is as essential and important as uniformity of
statute law. Complete uniformity can never be attained so long as
courts take an attitude similar to that of a Pennsylvania court, when
speaking of another uniform act:
... it is difficult to see why, in matters of legal procedure, it is desir-
able for us to assimilate the practice in Pennsylvania to that of Kansas
or Florida, however appropriate such uniformity may be with respect
to negotiable instruments, warehouse receipts and the like. For some
purposes it may be desirable to dress in ready-made uniforms, but it
'O'Brien v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 276, 234 S. W. 668 (1921).
' State v. Tucker, 151 Wash. 218, 275 Pac. 558 (1929); State v. Constable,
90 W. Va. 515, 112 S. E. 410 (1922).
' 10 U. L. A. sec. 7 (1922).
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is better for most men to be measured for their clothing and have
their coats cut to suit their individual requirements.
It might be possible to achieve uniformity by:
. . .getting all the courts to commence over again and follow the
decisions of some one court. The difficulties in the way of doing this
readily suggest themselves to the lawyer who has ever attempted to
get a court to overrule a former decision, or who has ever applied for
a rehearing. One of the greatest troubles would be in getting all the
others to follow the one. Each one would think itself the one to be
followed and not the one to follow.""
The National Conference realizes that the Act has failed in its
prime objective and has recommended that it be re-classified as a
Model Act. At their 1944 meeting, a preliminary draft of a revision
was submitted because:
None of the Commissioners from wlhom we have heard indicates the
existence of a demand in his state that its statute be amended more
nearly to conform with the provisions of the Uniform Act. This very
lack of uniformity and apparent absence of demand for uniformity
would seem to demonstrate that this Act does not lend itself to uni-
formity of treatment. All would agree in principle that proper steps
should be taken to prevent or punish the neglect of dependents, but
there well may be differences of opinion concerning the most effective
means to that end. Also, there may well be variances in social and
governmental structure in the several states that justify diversity of
treatment of the problem.-
Existing Kentucky Law. The statutory provisions in Kentucky
seem sufficiently adequate and comprehensive as to child desertion
and non-support so that no purpose would be served by adoption of
the Uniform Act. If the Act were adopted it would create new rights
and duties and would change the existing law in many respects and
thus make necessary much amendment and clarification of existing
statutes. Under the existing Kentucky criminal statutes, any parent
or other person having the care or custody of a child under six years
of age who wilfully deserts it in a manner showing reckless disregard
of its life or health is subject to punishment by confinement in the
penitentiary for not more than three years.5 There are no provisions
for fine, probation or imprisonment at hard labor with payment by
the state of a daily wage to the deserted wife or child for their sup-
port. There is no provision, other than imprisonment, for enforcement
of support of the child. Any parent of a child under the age of sixteen
who abandons it without making proper provision for its care is pun-
r'Duffs Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C. 815, 317 (1923).
' Tompkins, The Necessity for Uniformity in the Laws Governing Commercial
Paper, 13 A. B. A. REP. 247, 261 (1890).
Report, Committee on Review of Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act,
HANDBOQK, CONFERENCE OF COMIMSSIONERS OF UNrFonm STATE LAws, 272, 278
(1944). Cited in 9 Orro ST. L. J. 665 (1948).
"Ky. REv. STAT. 405.040; 405.990 (1953).
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ishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five
years.5 7 The circuit court has the power to postpone any indictment
under this statute during the good behavior of the defendant and may
suspend a verdict of conviction for the same reason, but such order
is subject to modification for five years.58 The defendant may inter-
pose such defenses as inability by reason of poverty, illness, physical
or mental incapacity, lack of knowledge of the existence of the child
and that the child was not left in destitute circumstances. 59 The fact
that friends or relatives may be providing for its support or that the
wife was awarded custody of the child by a divorce decree is not a
valid defense to a prosecution under the statute.0 0 There is no pro-
vision in the criminal statutes for support pendente lite, although there
are civil provisions as to alimony enforceable by contempt.6 1 A hus-
band who abandons his wife while she is pregnant, leaving her in
destitute circumstances, is punishable by confinement in the' peni-
tentiary from one to five years, 62 but there is no criminal liability for
the desertion or non-support of a wife who is not pregnant. Prosecu-
tion of the husband may be suspended upon a showing of good be-
havior, but such order is subject to modification for five years.
63
In any action for desertion or non-support of the wife or child,
neither the husband nor wife may testify as to confidential communi-
cations between them during their marriage.6 4 A strict construction
of the Kentucky statute calls for a relaxation of the rule as to privi-
leged communications only in actions for divorce. The husband or
wife cannot testify as to confidential communications in a civil pro-
ceeding for alimony or for support in an action separate from di-
vorce. ;5 In all cases, however, neither can be compelled to give
incriminating evidence against the other.
" Ky. REV. STAT. 435.240 (1) (1953).t 'KY. REV. STAT. 435.240 (2) (1953).
'Miller v. Com., 284 Ky. 70, 143 S. W. 2d 854 (1940); Cox v. Com., 280
Ky. 94, 132 S. W. 2d 739 (1939); Clark v. Com., 262 Ky. 576, 90 S. W. 2d 998,
(1936); Webb v. Com., 237 Ky. 141, 35 S. W. 2d 14 (1931); Brock v. Com., 206
Ky. 621, 268 S. W. 315 (1925).
'Black v. Com., 259 Ky. 169, 82 S.W. 2d 321 (1935); Parks v. Parks, 209
Ky. 127, 272 S.W. 419 (1925).1 Ky. REv. STAT. 403.055 (1953).
"Ky. REV. STAT. 435.240 (1) (1953).
Supra, note 58.
6 Ky. REv. STAT. 421.210 (1) (1953); For a very excellent note on this prob-
lem in Kentucky and a recommended statute proposed for adoption, see 38 Ky.
L. J. 459 (1950).
'London v. London, 211 Ky. 271, 277 S. W. 287 (1925); supra note 64;
In West v. Com., 210 Ky. 536, 538, 240 S.W. 52, 53, (1922), the wife was held
not to be a competent witness against the husband in a criminal action for desertion
and non-support of the child, the court saying: "While it is proved that the wit-
ness and accused have separated, and each of them has contracted a marriage
with afiother, there is no intimation that they have ever been divorced and the
marriage ties dissolved, so as to render her a competent witness to give testimony
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Adoption of the Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act would
result in the following changes in Kentucky's existing law:
1. The maximum penalty for desertion and non-support would be
reduced from five years to two years with a maximum fine of $500
in the case of desertion and non-support of a child under sixteen
years of age.
2. The husband would be criminally liable for the desertion and non-
support of a wife not pregnant. Such offense would be punishable
by a maximum penalty of two years with a fine of not more than
$500.
8. The husband would be criminally liable for support pendente lite
under the new act.
4. The Uniform Act would subject the state to payment of a stipu-
lated daily wage to the wife or child for each day the husband or
father spent in prison.
5. The defense of inability to provide for support would be sub-
stituted with the indefinite term "wilful" which would require
judicial interpretation.
6. Adoption of the Uniform Act would result in a relaxation of the
rule of evidence prohibiting the disclosure of confidential com-
munications by the husband or wife in a suit between them.
In addition, the Kentucky Act has the following provisions not in
the Uniform Act which would remain unaffected by its adoption:
1. The Kentucky Act provides penalties for the desertion and non-
support of a child by any person other than its parents who is
charged by law with the maintenance of a child.
2. The Kentucky Act distinguishes between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children.
3. The Kentucky Act provides penalties for failure to support a child
over the age of sixteen years who is mentally or physically unable
to support itself.
Conclusion. Since adoption of the Uniform Act would result in
the above changes or would necessitate revision or amendment to
make it conform to the existing law, it is submitted that the Act should
not be adopted. It is believed that the problem of non-support is one
which is incapable of uniform treatment by the several states. Further,
the Uniform Act is far from uniform since no state adopted it in its
entirety and many refused to adopt certain provisions of the act,
choosing to maintain their existing law on the subject.
The problem of desertion and non-support can be aided by giving
dependents improved legal weapons with which to prosecute default-
ers. Existing laws have not been adequate to handle the social,
financial and legal problems arising from desertion and non-support.
It is of great importance that claimants for maintenance be enabled
against him, under the general rule which excludes the testimony of a wife or
husband against the other. . . .When the marriage relation is once lawfully
established, it exists until the death of one of the parties, or until the status is
destroyed by a judgment of divorce." See also Hembree v. Com., 210 Ky. 833,
275 S. W. 812 (1925).
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to enforce their rights by judicial action without excessive difficulty,
delay and expense. Humanitarian reasons call for a simplification of
the legal labyrinth in which dependents find themselves when they
attempt to obtain support from defaulters.
Both the Uniform Support of Dependents Act and the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act-discussion of which follows-
were designed to meet some of the challenging problems which arise
when a person leaves the state in an effort to escape the responsibility
of supporting his dependents.
II. Reciprocal Support Legislation
In 1949, New York passed experimental legislation known as the
Uniform Support of Dependents Act (hereinafter referred to as the
U.S.D.A.). This act served as a model for legislation in a few other
states and was adopted by Kentucky in 1950.60 Almost immediately
after its adoption, a test case was filed with the Court of Appeals,
attacking the constitutionality of the Act. The Court upheld its validi-
ty, although many defects were noted. In the 1954 session of the
Legislature, this Act was repealed and replaced with the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act67 (hereinafter referred to as
the U.R.E.S.A.), drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. Both of these Acts were widely adopted and
now exist in one form or other in forty-six states and four other juris-
dictions. They create for the first time a two-state procedure, designed
to provide a quick and effective means of enforcing in one state the
duty of support against a father or other responsible person in another
state, a remedy heretofore non-existent. It is the purpose of the fol-
lowing to discuss the Act as it was originally adopted by Kentucky,
point out its defects as noted in the test case, show how these defects
were corrected by the adoption of the U.R.E.S.A., and to note some
of the defects in the new Act.
Remedies prior to adoption. Prior to the adoption of the U.S.D.A.
in Kentucky, when 9, deserting father or husband crossed a state line,
the difficulty of enforcing his obligation of support was great. The
major obstacle was that of obtaining in porsonam jurisdiction. Per-
sonal service was impossible since the deserter bad left the state. He
could be sued in the state of the deserted wife or child so long as his
LEGISLATIVE AcTS OF KmrrCy, Ch. 66 (1950).
'House Bill 309. By some incongruity, the new Act still bears the title of
Uniform Support of Dependents Act although it is an exact copy of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. House Bill 309, Sec. 1. In this Article,
the Acts will be referred to by their correct titles, i.e., the original Act will be
referred to as the U.S.D.A. and the new Act will be referred to as the U.R.E.S.A.
112 KENTUcKy LAW JOURNAkL
domicile remained unchanged, provided there was a statute allowing
substituted service. 8 If he owned property in the state, jurisdiction
quasi-in-rem could be obtained and any judgment against him could
be satisfied out of his property, 69 but the usual situation was that he
left no property in that state out of which a judgment could be satis-
fied, so that any judgment obtained was unenforceable. Although the
judgment was usually entitled to full faith and credit in the state to
which he had fled, the deserted wife or child could not afford the
costs of a second suit, especially if it meant going into some other
state. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution,
only final judgments must be recognized by another state.70 A decree
ordering the payment of alimony or support money in installments
is subject to modification, therefore not final and not entitled to recog-
nition. Only that part of the judgment ordering the payment of a
fixed sum already due is entitled to extra-state recognition. Thus, only
judgments for amounts accrued could be enforced, leaving the de-
pendent helpless as to future payments unless several successive suits
were brought. The fugitive father or husband was likely to compli-
cate matters further by going into a third state, thus avoiding his
responsibility wholly unless the wife or child could follow him from
state to state, enforcing at various intervals the judgment obtained
in the first state for amounts already accrued. If he changed his domi-
cile to one of these other states; then the deserted wife or child had
to obtain personal service on him in that state. By the simple method
of crossing state lines, a husband could effectively prevent his de-
pendents from enforcing family support obligations. It can easily be
seen that it was not unusual for the deserted wife or child to abandon
any attempt to obtain support from the father or husband. The logical
recourse for the dependents was to apply for public welfare, rather
than spend what little money they had trying to track down the de-
serter and force him to carry out his legal responsibility. The truth
is that there was no effective civil remedy to enforce support of aban-
doned wives or children where a father absconded to another state
for the purpose of avoiding his legal obligation.
Criminal methods of forcing the husband or father to support his
family are not usually adequately enforced, because the prosecuting
attorney does not care to devote him time to such 'unimportant' mat-
ters. The deserter is usually placed on probation only to desert again.
'Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
'o Sistaire v. Sistaire, 218 U.S. 1 (1910). However, some states have adopted
the policy of enforcing foreign alimony decrees on grounds of comity, enforcing
them in the same manner and with the same limitations as the issuing state would.
Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Calif. 2d 117, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941); Rule v. Rule, 313
Ill. App. 108 (1942).
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If he leaves the state, it necessitates the bringing of extradition pro-
ceedings, often clumsy and expensive, in order to bring him to trial
at the place where the crime was committed. In order to extradite
him, it must be shown to the governor of the asylum state that he has
fled from justice. Even when extradited little is gained because if
convicted he will be fined or placed in jail, or if placed on probation
he may refuse to work or may again leave the state. He may have
been extradited from a good paying job, and, if convicted and placed
in jail, the state not only must support his wife and children but must
also now support him. Criminal proceedings have proved impractical
also because they were never intended to secure support, their sole
purpose being to deter the husband from deserting or failing to pro-
vide for the support of dependents. Further impracticalities exist be-
cause the ambulatory husband may be prosecuted only in the state
where the dependents become destitute, usually the residence of the
wife or child at the time of abandonment. The reciprocal support
legislation was aimed to correct such situations.
Procedure Under U.S.D.A. The Kentucky U.S.D.A.7 1 prescribed
the procedure for civil proceedings to compel the support of dependent
wives, children, and poor relatives within and without the state of
Kentucky. It declares a husband liable for the support of his de-
pendents, and in addition provided for the support of children by the
mother in certain situations, and made parents severally liable for the
support of a child over seventeen unable to maintain himself and likely
to become a public charge.72 Divorce or separation did not relieve
the husband of his responsibility of support to any dependent child.
73
Maintenance orders include food, shelter, clothing, care, medical or
hospital expenses, expenses of confinement, expenses of education,
funeral expenses and any other reasonable or proper expense.74
The deserted dependent (petitioner) commenced support proceed-
ings in the county of his residence by filing a verified petition giving
the name, age, residence and circumstances of the petitioner, and of
the deserter (respondent). 75 If the respondent was present in the
county, the usual law of the state applied but if he had left the state
(initiating state) the judge transmitted the certified petition 6 to the
proper court in another state where he was believed to be residing
or domiciled (responding state) if that state had adopted a recpirocal
or substantially similar law. The judge in the responding state fixed
7'Ky. BEv. STAT. Ch. 407 (1953).
7'IKY. REv. STAT. 407.030 (1), (2), (3) (1953).7'KY. REV. STAT. 407.030 (7) (1953).
74 
Ky. REV. STAT. 407.040 (2) (1953).
" See Appendix for a model petition and testimony.
7'See Appendix for a model copy of the judge's certification.
114 K ucy LAw JOURNAL
a time and place for a hearing on such petition and issued a summons
directing the respondent to appear at a designated time and place.
If the respondent failed to appear, he was subject to punishment to
the same extent and in the same manner as a witness who wilfully
disobeyed a summons or subpoena. The respondent was personally
served and a hearing was held in the court of the responding state.
If he denied any allegation of the petition such fact was transmitted
to the court of the initiating state which took the petitioner's testimony.
It was not necessary for the petitioner or his witnesses to appear at
the hearing in the responding state since he was represented by a
public official of that state. When the court of the initiating state
received the denial of the respondent, a record of the petitioner's
answer was taken and forwarded with recommendations to the court
of the responding state where the hearing was resumed. Witnesses
of the petitioner and respondent were then cross-examined by depo-
sitions and written interrogatories. If the court of the responding
state found that the petitioner was entitled to support from the re-
spondent, such an order was entered and sent to the court of the
initiating state. Payments were made by the respondent directly to
the court of the responding state and forwarded to the court of the
initiating state for delivery to the petitioner. The respondent was
placed on probation by the court of the responding state and could
also be required to furnish recognizance in the form of a cash or
surety bond. The responding court could require him to make periodic
payments and to report personally to the probation department or
to some bureau of the court. If he wilfully violated the order of the
responding court, he was made subject to punishment for contempt
or for violation of probation. 77
Thus, without leaving home, the deserted dependent could invoke
the aid of judicial power with personal jurisdiction over the deserter.
For the first time, a deserted wife or child had an effective civil rem-
edy to compel support when the responsible head of the family had
left the state.78 Such a procedure has four advantages: (1) no longer
"Ky. REv. STAT. 407.060 (1953).
"' Even though the procedure is formidable, it has been said that difficulties
will be encountered in a large number of cases, especially in the case of ex parte
divorces in that the husband will, in many cases, obtain an ex parte divorce before
support proceedings are instituted in order to escape his responsibility of support,
and that the judge in the support proceeding will assume it valid, rather than
inquire into the bona fides of the husband's domicile in the state which granted
the divorce. See Mayers, Ex Parte Divorce: A Proposed Federal Remedy, 54 COL.
L. REv. 54, 56-57 (1954). However, as the writer suggests, the wife may defeat
this claim by seeking this support not as a wife but as a divorcee, upon the theory
that the ex parte divorce did not cut off her right to support in those states which
allow an ex parte action by the wife for alimony or support, notwithstanding a
divorce obtained by the husband. For a note on this problem enunciating the
general rule and its exceptions, see 34 Ky. L. J. 149 (1946). As to the effect of
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must the decree be final so that it will be enforced in another state
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (2) the husband's or father's
earning capacity is not cut off and he is not stigmatized with a criminal
record, (3) dependents have an inexpensive and convenient method
of obtaining past support money and are assured a method of com-
pelling future payments, and (4) expenditure of public relief funds
to dependent wives and children will be reduced proportionately to
the amount recovered from deserting fathers and husbands. The
burden of providing for a deserted family was thus shifted from the
state to the financially and physically able head of the family.
Jurisdiction. Under the Act as originally adopted, the court had
jurisdiction of the parties regardless of the state of last residence or
domicile of the petitioner or the respondent and whether or not the
respondent ever was a resident of the responding state.7 9 The pe-
titioner was required to be a resident of the initiating state, but his
personal presence within the responding state was all that was re-
quired to give that state jurisdiction.
The Act originally contained an unnecessarily complicated enumer-
ation of the instances when the court had jurisdiction to entertain a
proceeding to compel compliance with the duty of support.80 The
new U.R.E.S.A., repealing the original Act, makes no such enumera-
tion, but simply provides that the court shall conduct proceedings in
the manner prescribed by law for the enforcement of the type of sup-
port sought.8 ' Under this provision, the existing law of the state is
resorted to in order to determine whether the court has jurisdiction.
The defendant no longer can contend that the court has jurisdiction
only in the enumerated instances, as could be done under the original
Act. None of the other reciprocal support acts enumerate the cases
in which proceedings are maintainable. No need for such an itemized
enumeration is seen unless the purpose is to limit the jurisdiction of
the court.
Argument can be advanced for regarding the action for non-sup-
the U.R.E.S.A. on interstate recognition of alimony decrees, see Note 41 CALIF. L.
L. REv. 693, 699 (1953-54). The author of that note expresses the opinion that
the responding courts will still be faced with the constitutional question of full
faith and credit. He also expresses deep concern over the fact that in some situa-
tions, the choice of law problem may involve at least three states.
'Ky. REV. STAT. 407.040(1) (1953).
Ky. 11Ev. STAT. 407.050 (1953). Although the Kentucky Act was copied
from the New York Act, Kentucky omitted a portion of this section providing that
the court had jurisdiction: "Where the respondent was or is a resident of or
domiciled in the initiating state and has departed from such state leaving therein
a dependent in need of and entitled to support under this act and is believed to
be a resident of or domiciled in another state having substantially similar or
reciprocal laws." C.L.S. UNCONSOL. LAWS, Ch. 85, Sec. 5(d) (1952).
'House Bill 309. sec. 19 (1954).
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port as a transitory action, thus making presence alone the basis of
jurisdiction. The strict jurisdictional requirement of residence or domi-
cile often works a hardship on the families of migratory workers,
servicemen and other transitory workers. Such persons will undoubt-
edly at times become public charges of the state regardless of the fact
that their residence or domicile may be elsewhere or that they may
not, in fact, have any established residence or domicile. Presence of
the respondent within the state was made the sole basis of jurisdic-
tion under the original Kentucky Act and under the newly adopted
U.R.E.S.A. 2 If presence alone is sufficient to provide jurisdiction
over the respondent, it should likewise afford basis for jurisdiction
over the petitioner. In many instances it would result in a great saving
of time and expense to the petitioner, e.g., when she goes to one state
to bring non-support proceedings only to find that the respondent has
avoided her by crossing another state line. In no instance would it
be detrimental to the rights of the respondent, since he owes the duty
of support and it makes little difference which state enforces that
duty so long as that state has some interest in the matter. A deserted
petitioner is just as much a charge upon the public welfare whether
she be residing, domiciled or present in the state. It would certainly
seem better to aid the petitioner in securing support than to return
her to the state of her residence, since the cost of obtaining a court
order for her return may be far more than a proceeding to compel
support.
8 3
The original Kentucky Act contained a number of defects as to
jurisdiction, probably due to careless drafting but which were amend-
ed to avoid defeating the purpose of the enactment. Residence of the
petitioner in the initiating state was made the basis of jurisdiction
for a proceeding to compel support. However "initiating state" was
defined as the ". . . state of domicile or residence of the petitioner."84
(Italic's writer's.) Thus, it seemed that the petitioner was required
to be domiciliary of the initiating state. Such a requirement would
have unduly restricted the application of the Act. Under the newly
adopted U.R.E.S.A., the concept of jurisdiction based on domicile has
been abandoned and presence of either the respondent or petitioner
is stfficient to give both courts jurisdiction.85 Such a relaxation of
"Ky. REv. STAT. 407.050 (1953); House Bill 309, sec. 4 (1954).
See Adams, State Control of Interstate Migration of Indigents, 40 Mica. L.
REv. 711 (1942).
'Ky. RFV. STAT. 407.020 (9) (1953).
'House Bill 309, sec. 4 (1954). Despite the broad language used, it has
been indicated that the Act is of narrow application. According to Professor
Brockelbank, Chairman of the Committee that drafted the Act, the applicable law
may depend upon the presence of the obligor during the period for which support
is being sought, i.e., if the obligor was present in the responding state, the law of
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the jurisdictional requirement is necessary because of the difficulty
which would be encountered by a petitioner in trying to locate and
force the respondent to provide support. If more than the presence
of respondent within the responding state were required, recovery
would in most cases be defeated since the respondent would never
remain in any one state sufficient time to establish a domicile or resi-
dence in that state, thus circumventing the power of the responding
state to compel compliance. If the petitioner were required to be a
resident or domiciliary of the state where she files her complaint, she
would for relief in many cases be forced to return to another state
where the desertion actually took place. Jurisdiction on presence of
both parties gives effect to the full purpose of the Act and reduces
the expense incurred by the petitioner.
Kentucky was the first state to have the constitutionality of its
reciprocal support act carried to the highest state court. In the case of
Duncan v. Smith 6 the original Act was attacked on eight grounds,
discussion of which follows.
87
Are the Acts void for indefiniteness? It was contended that the
language of the U.S.D.A. was so indefinite as to be incapable of en-
forcement. The main argument on this point was directed toward the
various definitions contained in Ky. REv. STAT. 407.020. While the Act
gave many definitions of the word "court", it was held that so far as
Kentucky was concerned, this meant county or circuit court and that
the other definitions were for the sole purpose of describing appro-
priate courts in other states having a similar law. The same was held
true as to the many definitions given to "petitioner's representative",
the Court of Appeals holding that in Kentucky the County Attorney
was intended and that the other designated officials were for the pur-
pose of identifying the proper legal officers to represent the petitioner
in other states. In the new Act the County or Circuit Court was given
jurisdiction and the County Attorney was designated the official repre-
sentative of the petitioner.8  While the County Attorney may be the
proper official, he is already overworked in many counties. A further
objection can be made that since he obtains no added fees for such
that state will apply, but if the obligee is seeking an order for past support
which has not been paid and the obligor was in the initiating state when the past
support fell due, then the law of that state will apply. State of New York Joint
Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation, Summary of "Conference on
Social Welfare and Non-Support," 3 (1953).
1262 S.W. 2d 373 (Ky. 1953).
' This writer has been honored with a copy of the briefs filed with the court
by the attorneys: Hon. Lawrence G. Duncan, County Attorney of Jefferson
County and Hon. Gerald B. Johnson, Jr., Attorney for the Department of Economic
Security of Frankfort, Kentucky of counsel on the brief.
'House Bill 309, sees. 9, 11 (1954).
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work, he may develop a tendency to proceed only when compelled
rather than on his own initiative, resulting in a situation similar to
that of the laxness of prosecuting attorneys in criminal proceedings.
Aid in solving the problem might be found in the methods by which
other states handle such difficulties. Some states have set up special
welfare commissions to represent the petitioner.8 9 One state has pro-
vided for the appointment of some other person.90 Connecticut pro-
vides for a board of common pleas judges to appoint annually an at-
torney-at-law for each county to act as representative. 91 This appears
to be the best system yet discovered since it relieves the County A±-
torney of additional duties and enables the appointed attorney to, de-
vote the needed time and effort called for under the Act. [
Further argument was made that the Act imposed duties q'n the
"probation department or bureau" when Kentucky was acting ,, the
responding state and that, since Kentucky has no such departmeni ,or
bureau, the Act was so incomplete and conflicting that it could not bt,
properly executed. This argument was answered by holding that the
duties imposed on the department were merely mechanical and that
the provision was not mandatory. There was, therefore, no reason why
these duties could not be performed by the court itself or by the clerk
of the court as is done by court receivers or master commissioners.
Upon adoption of the new Act, such duties were placed on "the clerk
of the court or an official designated by the court."
92
The form of original Act has further been attacked in that the
enumeration of the persons who were liable for support did not
correspond with the enumeration of dependents.9 3 Ky. REv. STAT.
407.030(1) imposed a duty of support upon the husband to his wife
and children under seventeen years and any other dependent. Ky. REv.
STAT. 407.020(4) defined dependent to include ". . . a wife, child,
mother, father, grandparent, or grandchild .. " The word "husband"
was appropriate as to "wife" but not as to "child" and was wholly in-
consistent as to "mother, father, grandparent or grandchild." Did this
mean that only husbands were to support mothers, fathers, grand-
parents and grandchildren? While this objection may seem trivial, it
was one of the bases for denying relief in a case brought under the
'UTA-H H.B. No. 5 and S.B. No. 7 (1950).
' R.I. Public Laws, Ch. 2772, sec. 19 (1951) provides that petitioner's repre-
sentative is to be any person appointed by the Director of Social Welfare except in
reimbursement proceedings which are to be conducted by the city or town solicitor
and provides that the petitioner, if he wishes may employ his own counsel.
" SUPP. TO CONN. GEN. STAT., sec. 2441c (1953).
'"House Bill 309 Secs. 22(b), 23, 24 (1954).
'See particularly Ky. REv. STAT. secs. 407.040, 407.050 (1953). See also
Brockelbank. The Problems of Family Support-A New Uniform Act Offers A
Solution, 37 A.B.A.J. 93, 95-96 (1951).
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New York Act.0 4 While the Act may have been indefinite and uncer-
tain in some respects, it is believed that it was sufficiently clear for
execution under the well known principle that as between one or an-
other of reasonable interpretations of a statute, that interpretation
which will render the statute valid and operative should be adopted.
As has been said:
Mere imperfections may be cured by judicial construc-
tion. Clarification may be had by considering the character and
nature of the statute, and the purpose to be accomplished.'
The new Act makes no attempt whatever to enumerate the in-
stances where there is a duty of support but merely provides that:
'Duty of support' includes any duty of support imposed or
imposable by law, or by any court order, decree, or judgment, whether
interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce,
legal separation, separate maintenance or otherwise."
The person to whom support is owed is called the "obligee"97 and the
person owing the duty of support is called the "obligor."98 The other
definitions are much simpler and no objection can be made that new
duties of support are created or that the definitions are so vague and
indefinite as to render it unconstitutional.
Are the Acts special acts for benefit of a class? It was contended
that the Act allowed a diversion of public funds for the purpose of
providing legal representation for private persons, the private persons
being petitioners who were represented both in the initiating and
responding state by a public official without cost. This section of the
Act was not changed by adoption of the U.R.E.S.A. and therefore the
same objections could now be made. Section 171 of the Kentucky
Constitution requires that: "Taxes shall be levied and collected for
public purposes only. . . ." Section 3 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights
provides that: ". .. no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments
or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in con-
sideration of public services .... ." On first observation, it might ap-
pear that free services are being given to private litigants, but when
'Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 98 N.Y.C. 2d 470 (1950). The
court however, recommended an appeal for construction of the act on this and
other points. Petitioner, a resident of New York, seventy years of age and the
father of five adult children, named as respondents and who resided in New
Jersey sought to obtain "fair and reasonable support" from them. The Court
pointed out that Section 3 of the New York Act omits any reference or provision
for liability of grandparents, grandchildren or for the support of needy parents or
other poor relatives but that children over seventeen are the only poor relatives
covered by the Act.
' Folks v. Barren County, 3113 Ky. 515, 520, 232 S.W. 2d 1010, 1013 (1950).
"House Bill 309, sec. 2(6) (1954).
'House Bill 309, sec. 2(8) (1954).
' House Bill 309, see. 2(7) (1954).
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the real purpose of the reciprocal support acts is considered, (that of
securing"... support in civil proceedings for dependent wives, children
and poor relatives from persons legally responsible for their sup-
port;") 99 the free service of public officials representing the petitioner
is of secondary concern. (Italics writer's). Public funds in the form of
direct cash payments are made to the needy blind, pauper idiots,
needy aged and dependent mothers and children. If the Common-
wealth's Attorney may be required to maintain criminal prosecutions
for desertion and non-support, there is no good reason why a County
Attorney may not be required to maintain civil actions for the same.
There should be no objection to having a public official aid such per-
sons in obtaining support from those who are legally responsible for
their support. Actually, proper enforcement of the Act will decrease
the amount of payments from the public treasury. If the dependent
can obtain support from those responsible for his support, applications
for relief from the Welfare Department will be greatly reduced. It
has been reported that $4,000 per month is being collected by the
Brooklyn Family Court in cases between New York and New Jersey
alone, and that in 1951 $80,000 was collected by the New York Family
Courts and sent to abandoned -families without any cost to them.100
This figure multiplied by the number of jurisdictions having reciprocal
support laws will give some idea as to the reduction in payments from
welfare funds.
The court made no distinction as to representation of resident and
non-resident petitioners, holding that it is the duty of the petitioner's
representative to serve in every proceeding under the Act, both when
Kentucky is the initiating and responding state. If this be true, then
the Act may be objectionable in that it requires a public official of
this state to perform services not only for residents but also for non-
residents. Are taxes paid by the citizens of Kentucky being used for
the purpose of providing free legal services for citizens of another
state? Must a public official elected by citizens of Kentucky for pur-
poses of performing duties for 'citizens of Kentucky perform those
duties for citizens of other states? While there is no objection to public
funds being used for the benefit of resident petitioners, there may well
be some merit to the objection that public funds paid by citizens of
Kentucky should not be used for non-resident petitioners. While this
objection was not raised in the test case, it may be enough to render
Ky. REV. STAT. 407.010 (1958). This is the stated purpose in the original
Act. The new Act states that its purposes "are to improve and extend by reciprocal
legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the laws
with respect thereto." House Bill 809, sec. 1 (1954).
'Seaman, Making the Reciprocal Support Law Work, 25 STATE GovT. 182,
185 (1952).
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the Act unconstitutional in that respect. Upholding this objection,
however, would not avoid the whole Act in view of the severability
provision.' 0 1 While the Court of Appeals ruled as to the payment of
costs in a proceeding under the Act, holding that a non-resident peti-
tioner must pay the costs and that a resident petitioner may proceed
in forma pauperis, these costs do not include the payment of a fee to
the County Attorney for legal services rendered to a non-resident
petitioner. Such payment, if any, would have to come from public
funds levied from the citizens of Kentucky. While it may be the pub-
lic policy of Kentucky to aid her dependent wives, children, and other
dependents, such policy would not extend to protect resident- de-
pendents of other states. There is argument that the benefits are
reciprocal since other states when acting as responding states will be
aiding Kentucky dependents. This argument has merit if such aid is'
on an equal basis, but one state under the present system will more
than likely render more aid than it receives. Some method should be
arranged whereby the responding state will be reimbursed if the repre-
sentation of petitioners in that state is grossly unequal in relation to
the number of petitioners of that state represented in other states.
This is recommended for consideration when and if the Act is again
revised.
Extra-territorial effect. The third ground of attack on the con-
stitutionality of the original Act was that it was extra-territorial in its
application in that it gave Kentucky courts jurisdiction outside the state
and gave foreign courts jurisdiction within the state. There were
numerous situations where the language of the Act seemed to order
the responding court to perform certain functions with respect to ob-
taining jurisdiction of the respondent, holding a hearing, placing him
on probation and forwarding payments made by the respondent to the
initiating state. Other instances seemed to grant the responding court
power to operate within Kentucky.10 X ctually, however, the Act was
not mandatory in any respect, but merely described to the responding
state the action which was expected of it by the initiating state. Being
a reciprocal act, these duties were not imposed upon the foreign court
by Kentucky law or upon a Kentucky court by a foreign law but were
imposed by virtue of the law of that state. The responding court did
not perform these duties because the statutes of the initiating state
imposed them upon it but by virtue of their own statutes. It was
merely a case of careless statutory drafting.
1° KY. REv. STAT. 446.090 (1953).
'V_ Supra note 93 at 165. The author of this note compares the initiating state
to that of the Island of Tobago, saying that the initiating state, like the Island of
Tobago, cannot legislate for the whole world.
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The duties of the court under the new Act are practically the same
as those under the original Act. Upon receipt of the petition from the
initiating state, if the responding court finds that it cannot obtain
jurisdiction of the obligor because of inaccurate or inadequate state-
ments in the petition, this fact is communicated to the initiating state,
the responding court attempts to determine the accurate facts and
continues the case until the defect is cured or an amended petition is
received. 0 3 The responding court is given the same powers of en-
forcing compliance with its orders as was given in the original Act,
except that the clerk of the court or some other designated official is
to carry out the duties of the probation department.
There is little danger that the new Act will be attacked as extra-
territorial in nature since the Act clearly limits its commands to courts
and persons within the state. The commands are drawn in the form
of corresponding provisions, e.g., "the court of this state when acting
as an initiating state" and "the court of this state when acting as a
responding state." The same result is reached as under the original
Act, but through a better drafting method which eliminates any con-
tention that the legislature of one state is legislating for the other state.
Considerable objection was made to the section which provided
that after the initiating state had heard the petitioner's evidence "...
the court shall make its recommendation, based on all of such proof
and evidence, and shall transmit to the court in the responding state
an exemplified transcript of such proof and evidence and of its pro-
ceedings and recommendation in connection therewith" 104 and the
court of the responding state shall hear and determine the case. It was
thought that this section destroyed the jurisdictional power of the court
of the initiating state in that it limited the court to making recom-
mendaions rather than deciding the case which is its normal func-
tion.10 5 However, it must be remembered that the act was a reciprocal
act calling for a division of judicial functions, in that the complaint
was filed in one state and the final decision made in another. While
this may seem unique, it is not entirely new, since by use of depositions
and interrogatories the same has long been accomplished in taking
testimony. The initiating court could not make a final determination
of the case because it did not have jurisdiction of the respondent. At
that stage of the proceedings, only the petitioner was before the court
of the initiating state. Only the responding court would have power to
make a final order since it bad personal jurisdiction of the respondent
and the petitioner was before it by representation. While the respond-
' House Bill 309, sec. 18 (1954).
'Ky. RpEV. STAT. 407.030(7) (1953).
'Note, 45 ILL. L. REv. 252, 260 (1950). See also supra, note 93 at 165.
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ing court may not have full technical jurisdiction over the petitioner,
it did have jurisdiction sufficient to render a binding decree. It is not
always necessary that one be physically present in court for the court
to make a binding determination as to his rights. Many cases are tried
on depositions, default judgments are given, and in many personal in-
jury actions the plaintiff never appears in court. The Court of Appeals
disposed of this point by saying that there was no problem as to juris-
diction whatever, but merely- a question of practice.
Interstate compact. Do the Acts create a compact between the
states enacting it, without Congressional consent and therefore uncon-
stitutional? It was contended that when the several states "agreed" to
permit two state actions to be filed in their courts they agreed to extend
or abolish the jurisdiction of their courts and that such an agreement,
being political in nature, was contrary to the Constitution of the United
States which provides that "No state shall, without the consent of Con-
gress . ..enter into any agreement or compact with another state.
* . .-"6 It was early held that the prohibition against interstate com-
pacts without the consent of Congress was directed against agreements
that tend to increase political power. °T The difference between re-
ciprocal legislation and an interstate compact is greatOS8 An interstate
compact involves the making of a treaty which is negotiated and rati-
fied by two or more states and which requires the passage of other
legislation to declare the compact effective. Reciprocal legislation is
a method whereby one state, by legislative action obtains for its
citizens an advantage or immunity by conferring an advantage or
immunity to the citizens of another state on condition that the other
state make a similar grant to its citizens. No legislation between state
officials is necessary, no ratifying act is necessary and no compact is
entered into by any of the states. Reciprocal legislation further differs
from an interstate compact in that Congressional consent is not re-
quired for the former. Reciprocal legislation may be said to be con-
ditional legislation in that its effect depends upon passage of a similar
act by another jurisdiction, but this does not mean that it must be
ratified by the legislature of some other state. No one from Kentucky
went to the officials of any other state and negotiated with them. No
later act was passed to ratify adoption of the U.S.D.A. or the
U.R.E.S.A. Kentucky is under no contract with any other state to keep
the Act on its statute book. It can be repealed, revised, amended or
replaced at any time in the same manner in which it was adopted-by
" U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, Sec. 10, C1. 3.
"Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503 (1892).
Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliaton Legislation in the American States, 21
MmN. L. REv. 371 (1936).
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legislative action. Even if the Act should be held to be an interstate
compact, this does not necessarily mean that it is unconstitutional be-
cause Congressional consent may be implied from silence and ac-
quiescence.1 09
Are the Acts discriminatory in nature? Do the reciprocal support
acts violate the privileges and immunities clause of the United States
Constitution?"(' It Was contended that granting the petitioner the right
of free legal representation by a public official and denying the same
right to the respondent constituted a discrimination against residents
by denying such privilege to a petitioner when the respondent is
present in Kentucky. However, neither of the Acts make citizenship
of the petitioner in the initiating state a prerequisite to filing a petition.
All that was necessary under the original Act was that the petitioner
be a resident of the county in which the petition was filed. A non-
citizen of Kentucky could file a petition in the court of the county
wherein he resided. The same was required of citizens of Kentucky.
The petitioner was represented by the public official without regard
to whether he was a citizen or a non-citizen.
While a state's public policy may determine whether and to
what extent the state's courts will entertain transitory actions arising
out of state, that policy must operate alike upon its own citizens and
those of other states. The privileges which it affords to one must be
afforded to the other."' However, there may be a discrimination by
one state against the citizens of another state if there is a substantial
and valid independent reason, beyond the mere fact that they are
citizens of other states. 12 The privileges and immunities clause re-
quires only that a state to accord to citizens of other states substantially
the same right of access to its courts as it accords to its own citizens.
A citizen of any state could bring a proceeding under the U.S.D.A.
so long as he was a resident of the county where the proceeding was
filed. The only discrimination made under the Act was that a non-
resident petitioner was required to pay costs while a resident petitioner
a" Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of the States With One Another
and With the Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L. Pxv. 500, 516 (1918). See also,
Brockelbank, Is the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act Constitutional?, 17 Mo. L.
lRhv. 1, 3 (1952). It has been saidthat there are hundreds of interstate compacts
which have not been recognized by Congress but which are regarded as valid
powers of the states. For a very excellent note summarizing this field with par-
ticular emphasis on one type of interstate agreement, see Ferguson, The Legal
Basis for a Southern University-Interstate Agreements Without Congressional Con-
sent, 88 Ky. L. J. 847 847 (1950). And see, Note, 27 TEnPLE L.Q. 320, 826
(1954).
" U. S. CONST. Art. IV, See. 2.
'=Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 149 (1907). Bot
cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 841 U.S. 609 (1950).
=Toomer v. Witsell, 884 U.S. 885 (1947); Russo v. Reed, 98 F. Supp. 554
(1950).
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could proceed in forma pauperis. However, it has been held that even
though a state cannot forbid citizens of other states from suing in its
courts, it may require a non-resident to give bond for costs, although
such bond is not required of a resident, because a citizen of one state
is not entitled to every privilege that is given to the citizens of another
state. 113 A reasonable discrimination by the courts of a state against
non-residents does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of
the Constitution,114 since that clause only forbids arbitrary distinctions
against citizens of other states. Non-resident and resident petitioners
were represented by a public official free of charge, but only non-
resident petitioners had to pay costs. Thus, since the U.S.D.A. did not
discriminate against citizens, the only reason that it could have been
declared unconstitutional was that it discriminated against residents
by allowing a petitioner free representation when the respondent was
out of the state and denied this right of representation to a petitioner
when the respondent was within the state. However, since one of the
purposes of the Act was to provide a remedy for deserted dependents
when the respondent was out of the state, there was no discrimination,
but only a new remedy provided. There was no discrimination against
petitioners when the respondent was within the state because there
was no need for representation in another state. Neither was there any
discrimination in providing the petitioner with free legal representa-
tion and denying such to the respondent, because the whole purpose
of the Act was to secure support for dependent wives, children and
poor relatives." 5 The purpose of the Act was to provide a means of
reaching a respondent, not to confer any benefit on him. This purpose
was accomplished by compelling him to furnish support consistent
with procedural due process. No rights were taken away from the
respondent and at the same time no benefits were conferred upon him.
Under the provisions of the new Act, there is less likelihood that
any such contention will be made, even though free representation is
provided to only the petitioner. As will be remembered, the basis of
jurisdiction under the U.R.E.S.A. is presence of both the obligor and
obligee. While the obligor may still contend that he is being dis-
criminated against bynot being provided free representation, the con-
tention that non-resident obligees are being discriminated against can
no longer be made because the obligee is not required to be a resident
of the state where the proceeding is instituted. Presence within the
"'~Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898).21 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947); Van Schaick v. Parsons, 11 F.
Supp. 654 (1985); Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279
U.S. 377 (1929); LaTourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Corfield v.
Coryell, F. Cas. 3,230 (1823).
'=Ky. REv. STAT. 407.010(2) (1953).
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initiating state is all that is required. The new Act also contains a pro-
vision that the court may in its discretion direct that all fees or costs
be paid by the county, both when the state is acting as initiating and
responding state." 6 Under this provision, the court may direct that the
costs and fees of either a resident or non-resident obligee or of the
obligor be borne by the county. For these reasons, it is believed that
the decision of the court in the Duncan case, as to the contention that
the U.S.D.A. was discriminatory, would apply with even more force to
the new U.R.E.S.A.
Do the Acts require approval of other authority? Are reciprocal
support acts unconstitutional under that section of the State Constitu-
tion which invalidates laws enacted "... to take effect upon the ap-
proval of any other authority than the General Assembly . . ."?11
It was contended that since the U.S.D.A. would not be effective until
the Legislature of some other state enacted a similar law, its validity
was made to depend upon some other authority. While it is true that
the effectiveness of both the U.S.D.A. and U.R.E.S.A. is dependent
upon a similar enactment by the legislature of another state, the second
state does not legislate or make policy decisions for Kentucky. The
Acts contain no provision requiring the approval of any authority be-
fore they become effective, but go into effect ninety days after passage
by the Legislature. Effective operation, however, is conditioned upon
passage of a similar act by some other state. Its operative sphere is
limited to those jurisdictions which have similar legislation. Although
useless without passage of similar acts by other states, it would still
have operative effectiveness dependent upon some event in the future.
Statutes many times are enacted to take effect upon some contingency
provided for in the statute. Reciprocal legislation is similar in that the
action of a foreign government is the contingency upon which the law
becomes operative. There is no difference in principle between such
a contingency and one which is provided for in the statute. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, in dealing with another reciprocal law has
said:
It is clear . . that the legislature may enact a law to take effect
when certain conditions arise. By the act in question the legislature
itself says that, when certain conditions exist, the law shall be so and
so. A foreign state may create the conditions, but it has no voice in
determining what our law shall be. Our own legislature prescribes
the condition. It alone says when the law shall apply. If the condi-
tions never arise the act is quiescent. When they do arise it im-
mediately becomes effective, not by virtue of the voice of the foreign
legislature, but by virtue alone of the legislative will of this Corn-
fl6 House Bill 809, see. 14 (1954).
'm Ky. CONST. sec. 60.
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monwealth. In the enactment of such a law, there is no surrender of
the legislative function. It does not take effect on the approval of any
other authority than the General Assembly....'
Due process. Are the reciprocal support acts unconstitutional in
that ex parte evidence is allowed, the defendant not being confronted
with witnesses? It was contended that the U.S.D.A. was a criminal or
quasi-criminal statute, in that it permitted criminal punishment to be
imposed upon the respondent without allowing him an opportunity to
confront his accusers, thus violating both the United States and Ken-
tucky Constitutions.1 1 9 The specific provisions attacked were those
permitting the use of ex parte evidence, allowing the court of the
initiating state to make recommendations before hearing the respond-
ent, and by allowing the responding court to place the respondent on
probation, requiring him to furnish recognizance bond and report
periodically while on probation subject to contempt sanctions.
However, any proceeding brought under the Act was purely civil.
The purpose of the Act was to secure support in civil proceedings for
dependents "from persons legally responsible for their support"'120 and
to make this civil proceeding additional or alternative to any other
remedy.121 Since the proceedings are not criminal in nature the re-
spondent is not entitled to confrontation of witnesses, and the require-
ments of due process are satisfied by cross-examination of the petitioner
by means of depositions or written interrogatories. The evidence was
not subject to attack as hearsay since the Act itself provided for cross-
examination. While it may be true that such cross-examination would
not be as effective as if the witnesses were personally before the
respondent, this appears to be one of those instances where "the
necessity of justice requires it," 122 since one of the purposes of the Act
was to give a deserted dependent an opportunity to obtain support
without leaving the state. The respondent would be at a disadvantage
in not having.a representative before the initiating court, since the
petitioner's representative was always before the responding court for
the purpose of cross-examining the respondent. However, this is not
too objectionable since it may be presumed that the court can de-
termine those factors affecting the credibility of witnesses and detect
us Clay v. Dixie Fire Insurance Co., 168 Ky. 315, 319-320, 181 S.W. 1123,
1125 1916). See also Hunter v. City of Louisville, 204 Ky. 56-, 265 S.W. 277(1924 " .. . .
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI; Ky. CONST. sec. 11.
''Ky. Rlv. STAT. 407.080(2) (1953).
-'Ky. REv. STAT. 407.080 (1953).
' Laurel Printing Co. v. James, 6 Boyce (Del.) 185, 97 A. 601 (1916);
Advertisers Exchange v. Bleist, 40 Ohio 212, 57 N.E. 2d 91 (1943). In People
v. Graber, 397 Ill. 522, 527, 74 N.E. 2d 865, 867 (1947), the court stated:
"... we know of no rule or statute... which requires the plaintiff to personally
appear before the court in order to prosecute his suit."
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any attempt to work a fraud on the court. If the respondent believes
that his rights will be prejudiced, he can return to the initiating state
immediately upon being personally served, enter his defense and cross-
examine the witnesses in a more effective manner.
After the judge of the initiating state heard the petitioner's evi-
dence, under the U.S.D.A., he made recommendations to the judge of
the responding court and forwarded them to that court. It should be
noted that this recommendation was made without the initiating
judge ever seeing the respondent and before any testimony was intro-
duced. It is unfortunate that the Act was not more specific as to what
type of recommendation the initiating judge might make. Could he
recommend as to the final disposition before the respondent introduced
any testimony? Did he recommend that the petitioner had introduced
sufficient evidence to continue the hearing or as to the credibility to
be given to the petitioner's witnesses on the basis of his observation of
them? 12 3 The initiating court could not have possibly made recom-
mendations as to the final disposition of the case since that court never
had jurisdiction of the respondent. Its recommendation as to a fair
and reasonable amount, based upon its view of the needs and circum-
stances of the petitioner would be of great assistance to the responding
court, which could view this recommendation according to the means
of the respondent. Proper recommendations by the initiating court
would have related to continuance of the case, the credibility of the
petitioner's witnesses or the equities involved which were incapable
of being ascertained by the responding court. Although the recom-
mendations were not binding on the responding court, since the court
which has jurisdiction of both parties makes the final order, they
would have proved helpful by providing knowledge which the re-
sponding court would have no method of obtaining, such as the past
record of the respondent, his likelihood of attempting to escape the
order of the court and a fair appraisal of the needs of the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals held that the provisions as to probation of
respondent had no application in Kentucky since there is no procedure
for probation except after conviction for a criminal offense. The court
ruled that these provisions were another of the instances where the Act
referred to the procedure of other states having a reciprocal law. If
such provisions were enforced in Kentucky, the U.S.D.A. would prob-
ably have been classified as a quasi-criminal act. Their inapplicability
would have rendered the Act less effective to some degree, in that
Kentucky when acting as responding state would not have had that
power. However, if the respondent failed to obey the order of the
' See Note, 45 ILL. L. REv. 252, 260 (1950).
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court, he could have been punished for contempt as in a case of viola-
tion of an order to pay alimony.
124
There is no question but that the provision allowing punishment
of the respondent for contempt for violation of the court order was
valid. This punishment was not for criminal contempt but was civil
in that the court was merely coercing compliance with its orders
which were entered for the benefit of the petitioner and not for the
purpose of vindicating the authority of the court.125 There could be
objection to the contempt provision on the ground that the responding
court was enforcing the laws of the initiating state since the contempt
would be for violation of the order of the responding court. Thus, the
U.S.D.A. appeared to be procedurally constitutional since the respond-
ent was given notice, had a fair hearing and an opportunity to present
evidence and answer any allegations or claims against him.
The new Act does not contain any provision as to the manner in
which proceedings are to be conducted but merely provides that:
The court shall conduct proceedings under this Act in the
manner prescribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the
type of duty of support clained.
This practice is in line with that of the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws in not inserting procedural matters in the various uniform acts.
The Commission suggested that the adopting states follow New Jersey's
provision that depositions and interrogatories be taken as is allowed
in other courts of record. The suggestion was based on the belief that
if procedural matters were not provided by the adopting state, the
whole Act might be void for lack of definiteness. This was done by
every state adopting the Act except Kentucky, but there is good reason
to believe that the usual rules for jurisdiction, procedures and appeals
will govern. In all likelihood, the net result will probably be that the
procedure will be similar to that followed under the original Act. As
to rules of evidence, however, the new Act provides that the court is
bound by the rules that govern the Juvenile Court.127
Penal nature of Acts. Are the reciprocal support acts unconstitu-
tional in that the responding state enforces penal laws of the initiating
state? It is well settled that the courts of one state cannot enforce
claims arising under the penal laws of another state. 28 The United
-"' See Note, 41 Ky. L. J. 835 (1953)
'See Note, 13 Ky. L. J. 807 (1925).
' House Bill 809, see. 19 (1954).
' House Bill 309, see. 26 (1954).
' Wharton, CoNFL c'Ts oF LAWS, see. 4 (3rd ed. 1905); Goodrich, CONFLiCrs
OF LAWs, sec. 12 (8rd ed. 1949); Stumberg, CoNFLicT oF LAws, 67-68 (2nd ed.
1950); Beale, CoNFLIcr oF LAWS, 443.1 (1935).
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States Supreme Court in the leading case of Huntington v. Attrill 9 laid
down the test in determining whether or not a statute was a penal law,
as follows:
Whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects may
be called penal is a penal law in the international sense, so that it
cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the
question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the pub-
lic justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person
injured by the wrongful act.
The test is not by what name the statute is called by the
Legislature or the courts of the state in which it was passed, but
whether it appears to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it,
to be, in its essential character and effect a punishment of an offense
against the public, or a grant of a civil right to a private person.
Applying this test, the reciprocal support acts are certainly not penal
statutes since they do not attempt to punish the respondent for any
offense against the public but merely grant to the petitioner an
alternative civil remedy which in no way impairs any other remedy,
civil or criminal.131 It is true that failure to provide support for de-
pendents is a criminal offense also, but under the Acts the offense is
dealt with as entirely civil.
Creation of new duties. The U.S.D.A. has been attacked as creating
new duties of support instead of giving the deserted dependent a more
effective method of enforcing existing duties.132 If this be true, then it
certainly was objectionable and unsuitable for widespread adoption
because of the great difference with which the states view the duty of
support, some having a wide list of duties and others having a nar-
row list. The primary function of these reciprocal support acts is to
provide a new remedy for enforcing existing rights and not to create
new rights and duties. However, on many occasions, the U.S.D.A.
did seem to declare that the law to be applied was that of either the
initiating or responding state. A dependent was defined as one who
was ".. . entitled to support from a person who is declared to be legally
liable for such support by the laws of the state or states wherein the
petitioner and the respondent reside."133 (italics writer's) Many other
sections of the original Act contained the same or similar wording as
to what law was applicable. 34 If this meant that the law of either
state could be applied in order to declare the respondent liable for the
- 146 U.s. 657 (1892).
Ibid. at 673 and 683.
lHouse Bill 309, sec. 3 (1954).
Supra, note 93.
'Ky. Rm,. STAT. 407.020 (4) (1953).
a" See the following sections of Ky. REv. STAT. 407.020(7); 407.020(8);
407.030(5); and 407.030(6) (1953).
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support of the petitioner then many new duties of support were
created, depending only on the number of states wherein the respond-
ent and petitioner resided. Under this construction, a respondent
might have found that he was liable for the support of persons to
whom he formerly owed no legal duty. For example, one is not legally
liable for the support of his grandchildren in Kentucky. If, however,
he left the state and went to another state where such liability exists,
a proceeding for their support of the grandchildren could have been
maintained under this construction of the original Act. Many such
examples could be presented. If the law of either state could be ap-
plied to determine whether a duty of support is owed, the petitioner
in every instance would have asked for the application of that law
which was more liberal from her standpoint. If the duty was owed
according to the law of some other state, there would have been many
instances where new duties of support would have been created. The
usual rule is that the character and extent of the obligation of support
are determined by the law of the father's domicile and not by the place
of the child's residence. 135 In most cases, the domicile of the father
would not have been affected by his going into another state and the
applicable law would have been that of the state of the petitioner.
Another possible construction was that the dependent could not
recover unless the court found that the respondent was liable for such
support by the laws of both states, i.e., where petitioner resided and
where the respondent was present. Such a construction would have
restricted recovery to only those few cases where the laws of both
states were the same. In most situations, where such a contention
would be favorable to the respondent, he would have always contended
that he was present in a state other than that of the petitioner at the
time the failure to provide for her support occurred. Such a con-
tention, if proven, would have denied recovery to the petitioner. And
what of the cases where the respondent had no bona fide residence
but was a migratory worker, serviceman, or deserting traveling sales-
man? Under the above construction, he could have chosen some
favorable jurisdiction as his residence and thus avoid entirely his legal
responsibility of support. The proper law would seem to be that of
the state of the residence of those who are required to be supported.' 36
Under the new Act, the problem as to what duties of support are
'Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); 39 Am. JuR. 635 (1942).
'This is the rule that has been applied in a few civil cases and is the rule
that is applied in criminal proceedings for non-support: Com. v. Booth, 266 Mass.
80, 165 N.E. 29 (1929); State v. Hobbs, 220 Mo. App. 632, 291 S.W. 184 (1927);
People v. Dimitry, 163 Misc. 279, 297 N.Y.S. 1002 (1937). See also: Gravitt v.
Com., 232 Ky. 432, 23 S.W. 2d 555 (1930). But cf. State v. Fick, 140 La. 1063,
74 So. 554 (1917).
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enforceable has been somewhat lessened by including those duties
already imposed or imposable by law or court order. Thus, only those
duties which now exist or which may exist in the future will be en-
forced. However, the problem as to the applicable law to enforce this
duty is yet unsolved. The U.R.E.S.A. as originally promulgated gave
the obligee of the support obligation a choice of two laws: (1) that
of the state where the obligor was present when the failure to provide
support occurred, or (2) that of the state where the obligee was
present when the failure to support commenced. The purpose of this
was to provide the obligee with a remedy when the whereabouts of
the obligor was unknown.137 However, under a later amendment of
the Act, this section was changed to the provision now in the Act as
adopted by the 1954 Legislature, and the applicable law is that of any
state where the obligor was present during the period for which sup-
port is sought.138 He is presumed to have been present in the respond-
ing state during this period unless proven otherwise. The reason given
by the Commission for this change was that the obligee had no abso-
lute right to choose an alternative applicable law but only the pre-
sumptive right to have the law of his own state applied until it could
be shown that the obligor was in another state when the failure to sup-
port occurred, in which case the law of that other state was to be ap-
plied automatically. 39 The change was based upon the case of Com-
monwealth v. Acker,140 where a husband, his wife and child were
living in Nova Scotia and were citizens of Great Britain. The husband
abandoned the wife and child and obtained employment in Massa-
chusetts but lived apart from her husband, leaving the child in Nova
Scotia. The husband was prosecuted in Massachusetts for failing to
support the child. Under Massachusetts law non-support of a child
was a criminal offense but there was no such statute in Nova Scotia.
The accused's counsel argued that the offense could not be committed
because the child was outside the state. The court sustained the con-
viction, saying:
The offender is here, within our jurisdiction. While resid-
ing here, he ought to make provision for the support of his wife and
minor children, whether they are here or elsewhere. If he fails to do
this, his neglect of duty occurs here, without reference to the place
where the proper performance of his duty would confer benefits."'
Brockelbank, Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Support, 2 ST. Louis
UNIv. L. J. 12, 15 (1952).
"'House Bill 309, sec. 7 (1954).
"'Note, 7 Aa. L. REv. 363, 366 (1953).
"'197 Mass. 91, 83 N.E. 312 (1908). This case may be regarded by some
as laying down the extreme rule that the duty of support may be enforced against
the obligor even though the dependents live in foreign countries. This writer does
not believe the rule to be either harsh or extreme since the court had jurisdiction
based on temporary presence.
' Ibid. See also: Smith v. State, 156 Tenn. 599, 4 S.W. 2d 351 (1928);
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The rule of that case was that, in order to determine legal rights and
duties in relations between persons in different jurisdictions, the ap-
plicable law is the law to which the person alleged to be under a duty
was subject at the significant time and not the law to which the person
claiming the right was subject. 142 Thus, this amendment brings Sec-
tion 7 in accord with the original intention of the National Conference,
that it be used only when the petitioner does not know the where-
abouts of the respondent, and not to provide an absolute right to
choose which law to proceed under. However, this writer can think
of many situations where the obligee would fail under this provision
of the Act. For example, suppose that the obligor has been present in
at least two states during his failure to provide support. He is found
in the responding state and the obligee elects to proceed under the
law of that state. However, when the trial comes to isstie, the obligor
proves that he was present in some other state during the period and
that under the laws of that state he does not owe a duty of support
to the obligee. Thus, in such a situation, the obligee would be denied
relief. Under the original version of the Act, she could have proceeded
under the laws of the state where she was present when the failure to
support commenced. The amended section has not yet received the
approval of all concerned and a committee of the National Conference
has taken the problem under study.143 The better rule would seem to
be to apply the law of the state of the residence of those who are re-
quired to be supported as is done in criminal proceedings for non-
support.
144
The U.S.D.A. was adopted by only eight states, 145 the majority of
State v. Borum, 188 La. 846, 178 So. 371 (1937); Com. v. Jamison, 149 Pa. Super.
504, 27 A. 2d 535 (1942). These states consider the offense of non-support a
continuing offense saying that the duty of support follows the deserter wlerever
he goes and that he may be prosecuted where found regardless of the presence
or residence of the dependents.
,-Stimson, Simplifying the Conflicts of Laws, 36 A.B.A.J. 1003, 1005 (1950).
"'Manual of Procedure, RECmnnocAL STATE LEGISLATION TO ENFORCE THE
SuPPoRT OF DEPENDENTS, Council of State Governments, 22 (1953).
"' Another possible solution to the choice of laws problem would be to adopt
the Conflicts rule that Virginia adopted in its original act, that ". . . whenever a
person residing in this state fails to provide for the support of any other person,
wherever resident, to whom the duty of support is owed under law of this state
or would be owed if such other person were a resident of this state ... the court
may make orders for support...."
Such a statute takes the position that the question is procedural, applying the
law of the forum. This provision is subject to the attack that jurisdiction of the
respondent is based, not on presence as in all other acts, but on residence and
unless the petitioner can prove his residence in the state, he will be denied re-
covery. However, it must be admitted that such a statute does simplify the
choice of laws problem, even though it be undesirable.
"'These states are: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, New York, South Carolina
and Virgin Islands. Two states have special acts which are similar in nature to the
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jurisdictions (41 including the adoption by Kentucky) adopting the
U.R.E.S.A. Some of the states which originally adopted the U.S.D.A.,
including Kentucky, have since repealed it and adopted in its stead
the U.R.E.S.A., which was drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American
Bar Association in 1950. After two years of operation, a number of
defects were discovered and the Act was amended in 1952 with many
improvements. Five sections of the original U.S.D.A. were eliminated
and nine new sections added to take care of problems not covered by
the original enactment. Although the U.R.E.S.A. is largely a revision
of the U.S.D.A., it contains many important provisions not found in the
latter Act. These will be discussed in the remaining portion of this
Article.
Criminal enforcement. Under the criminal provisions of the new
Act, the Governor of the adopting state is allowed to surrender to or
to demand the surrender from any other state, any person charged
with the crime of non-support, even though the obligor was not in the
demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and even
though he had not fled from justice.140 He may escape extradition if
he submits to the jurisdiction of the initiating or demanding state and
complies with the court's order of support.147 These criminal provisions
are practically a copy of Section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Act,148
U.S.D.A. and the U.R.E.S.A., but which were not modeled after these acts,
Delaware and Minnesota. Those two states which have not yet adopted any act
are Mississippi and Nevada. All the other states have adopted either the original
or amended version of the U.R.E.S.A. Manual of Procedure, lEcIPROCAL STATE
LEGISLATION TO ENFORCE THE SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS, Table 1, 23 (1953).
46 House Bill 809, sec. 5 (1954).
"47 House Bill 309, sec. 6 (1954).
"' "The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the Execu-
tive Authority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other
state in the manner provided in Section 3 with committing an act in this state,
or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose Executive
Authority is making the demand and the provisions of this act not otherwise in-
consistent shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not in that state
at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom. (Italics
writer's.) UNIFoRM CIMnmAL EXTRADITION ACT, sec. 6, 9 U.L.A. (1951). The
procedure followed in an extradition under the act is as follows: the Executive
Authority of the demanding state after authentication of the papers forwards his
request for extradition with either a copy of an indictment or an information sup-
ported by an affidavit to the Executive Authority of the asylum state. With this
is enclosed a copy of any warrant or a copy of a conviction or sentence imposed.
The request must allege, except for cases under Section 6 that the accused was
present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime and
thereafter fled from justice therefrom. The Executive Authority of the asylum
state may investigate to see if extradition should be granted. If he then decides,
in his discretion, that the request should be honored, he signs a warrant of arrest
directed to any peace officer of the asylum state authorizing the officer to arrest
the accused and deliver him to the agent of the demanding state. UNIFOIL r
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT, 9 U.L.A. (1951).
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which has been adopted by thirty-eight states and which has been held
constitutional by four state courts.'4 9 It has been said that this does not
create a new crime but merely facilitates interstate rendition of those
guilty of the existing crime of non-support. 150 However, it will be
noted that under this provision the established grounds for extradition
have been dispensed with.
The extradition provision in the United States Constitution is:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice and be found in another
State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime."M
Federal and state courts alike have interpreted the Constitution to
restrict the extradition procedures to those persons who were physically
present in the demanding" state at the time of the commission of the
crime and who fled therefrom.152 However, the Supreme Court has
sanctioned the liberalization of the extradition process by the states
as a valid exercise of their sovereign powers. Even though the elements
of extradition are based on the Constitution and Congressional
statutes, it has been held that a statute may permit or require extra-
dition on easier terms than required by the Constitution. 53 In some
cases, part of the non-support may have occurred in the demanding
state, but what of the case where the obligor left the demanding state
to seek employment elsewhere and thereafter decided that he would
no longer support his dependents? Clearly the crime of failing to pro-
vide support would not then have been committed in the demanding
state, yet under this provision of the Act the demanding state may
nevertheless extradite him.'5 However, it has been held in many
' 9Ex Parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Calif. 1948); State ex rel. Gildar
v. Kriss, 191 Md. 568, 62 A. 2d 568 (1948); People ex rel. Fauls v. Herberich,
93 N.Y.S. 2d 272 (1949); Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E. 2d
807 (1942).
Brockelbank, MULTIPLE STATE ENFORCEmENT or FAMLmm SUPPORT, 2 ST.
Louis UNIv. L. J. 12, 13 (1952).
'U.S. CoNsT. Art. 4, See. 2, Cl. 2.
"Daugherty v. Hornsby, 151 F. 2d 799 (1946); Ex parte Montgomery, 246
U.S. 656 (1917); Appleyard v. Com. of Mass., 203 U.S. 222 (1906); Hyatt v.
People of State of N.Y. 188 U.S. 691 (1903).
'See Note, 5 Foan. L. REv. 484 (1936).
What of the contention that the crime of abandonment and non-support is
a crime of omission while See. 6 of the Act provides for the extradition of those
persons "committing an act in this state or a third state intentionally resulting in
a crime in the demanding state." This question was raised in U.S. v. Johnson,
63 F. Supp. 615 (D. Ore. 1945), where the judge expressed serious doubts as to
the extradition for the crime of non-support since it was a crime of omission.
This problem had been foreseen by a writer at a much earlier date, who sug-
gested that in order to avoid this problem, a statute should read ". . . who while
within this state wilfully does or omits to do any act or duty the doing or omission
of which results in the consummation of a crime." Reid, Interstate Extradition for
Extra-Territorial Crime, 45 A.B.A. EP. 432, 440-442 (1920).
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cases that acts committed in one state result in a crime in some other
state.155 The action of the obligor outside the state in not supporting
his dependents certainly has a criminal result in the state where the
dependents reside and public policy demands that he be held crimi-
nally liable for his acts.
While there may be some instances where the criminal provisions
of the Act will be useful, it is believed that they are not needed since
most states already have adequate criminal statutes for enforcing the
duty of support. The only advantage obtained by this provision is that
it is not necessary to show that the obligor was in the state at the time
he failed to furnish support nor that he fled from justice. While these
advantages are desirable, many states already have or could easily
adopt such statutory provisions. Extradition and criminal enforcement
is a fruitless remedy insofar as providing support for needy dependents
is concerned. Costs are disproportionately expensive to the result
achieved. Forcing the husband to serve a jail sentence merely places
a double burden on the state.156 He may have been extradited from
gainful employment and if brought back, this course of income will be
eliminated. If extradited, he may not be able to find a job with his
newly acquired criminal" record. It should be pointed out that the
criminal provisions of the Act cannot be reciprocally enforced, since
such extra-territorial enforcement of foreign criminal statutes would
be objectionable under the rule that penal laws of another state can-
not be enforced by some other state.157 The only possible advantage in
' Strossheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). See also, Berge, Criminal Juris-
diction and the Territorial Principle, 30 MicH. L. Rrv. 238 (1931). However, in
Ex parte Hawkins, 37 Okla., Crim. 97, 255 P. 718 (1927), wherein it appeared
that the husband and wife resided in the asylum state and that the wife there-
after moved to another state, the husband was not a "fugitive from justice" of the
.state to which the wife had moved. Many early cases laid down the rule that one
who furnishes adequate support to his family while he remains in the state
where they are but later removes to another state, and then fails to continue the
support is not, with respect to the offense of non-support, a fugitive from justice
of the state where the destrted wife or child remains and is not subject to extra-
dition. Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539, 103 A. 644 (1918); Re Roberson, 38 Nev. 487,
137 P. 88 (1915); People v. Higgins, 109 Misc. 328, 178 N.Y.S. 728 (1919). For
an interesting case holding the defendant liable for non-support in the state of the
deserted dependents and subject to extradition because he visited his dependents
there on two occasions for "only a few hours," see People v. Brown, 237 N.Y. 483,
143 N.E. 653 (1924).
'.In answer to this argument, it may be said that even though extradition is
expensive, it results in less expense to the state than if the accused were not com-
pelled to recognize his obligation, because then the state would have to support
Ws family. This is true so far as it goes but it overlooks the fact that if extradited
and placed in jail, who supports the family? And then there is also the burden
of supporting the jailed husband.
' See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1908),
where the Court objecting to this method of extra-territorial enforcement of
criminal statutes said: ". . . the general and almost universal rule is that the
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
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the use of the criminal provisions is that they may be used to threaten
the respondent into complying 'with his duty. The National Confer-
ence has recognized the desirability of civil enforcement over criminal
enforcement. Their report states:
The proposed act contains provisions for both civil and
criminal enforcement. While both have their importance, it is prob-
able that the civil remedies will be more frequently used. Criminal
punishment has little but a deterrent effect, while the civil remedies
will make the means of the husband and father actually available to
those in need. It is of little comfort to a needy family to say that we
will put the bread-winner in jail.' s
Punishment of the obligor does not solve the problem of furnishing
support to dependent wives and children. It either allows him to evade
his duty or forces the state to assume the support of both the obligor
and obligee. Amendments to the Act to make the provision's for
criminal enforcement more satisfactory are needed. Perhaps a plan
similar to that adopted by Wisconsin would solve the problem. Under
the Huber Act,159 more commonly called the Day Parole Plan, the hus-
band is allowed to hold a regular job, but is confined in the county jail
when not at work. He is strictly supervised but his earning power is
not reduced. His wages are handled by the sheriff, who disburses them
to the family, thus enabling him to support himself and his family with
the assurance that this duty will be carried out. It is reported that the
plan has been highly successful in operation. 160 It is believed that the
criminal provisions of the Act require amendment before they will be
of much aid in enforcing the duty of support.
Additional provisions not in U.S.D.A. A proceeding under the
U.R.E.S.A. is begun exactly as under the U.S.D.A., by filing a verified
petition in the proper court, such petition setting forth he required in-
formation and other useful information that is available to the peti-
tioner.16 Special provision is made for a proceeding by a minor. The
of the country where the act is done .... For another jurisdiction, if it should hap-
p en to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than
those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would
be an interference with the authority of another soverign, contrary to the comity
of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent."
lnNat'l. Conf. of Comm. on Unif. State Laws, Report of Special Commission
on All Phases of the Subject Matter of Desertion and Non-Support, 2 (1949).
Cited in 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 300, 302 (1950). The Council of State Govern-
ments in speaking of criminal enforcement in general says that a criminal process
is impractical because of expensive extradition costs, the limited nature of the
criminal statute and the fact that the arrest of the husband or father destroys the
source of wage earnings. Manual of Procedure, Reciprocal State Legislation to
Compel the Support of Dependent Wives and Children Within and Without the
State (1950). Quoted in Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 1029, 98 N.Y.S.
2d 470, 473 (1950).
Wis. STAT. sec. 56.08 (1951).
' See Note, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 544, 553-555 (1952).
'House Bill 309, sec. 10 (1954).
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duties of the initiating state are practically the same as those under the
U.S.D.A. except that they are made more clear. The Department of
Economic Security is made the information agency, the exact number
of petitions to be sent to the responding state is specified and acknowl-
edgment of receipt is required of the responding court. When the
court of the initiating state has reason to believe that the obligor may
attempt to flee from the responding state upon learning of the institu-
tion of the proceedings, it may request that the responding court ob-
tain jurisdiction of him by arrest, if permissible under the laws of that
state.162 This provision may prove to very important. In many in-
stances, the obligor upon learning of the proceedings may then flee to
another state, thus requiring the dependent to institute new proceed-
ings in that state or necessitating transfer of the petition to the other
state. This unnecessary delay would result only in the dependent be-
ing forced into more destitute circumstances. However, the courts
should be careful not to abuse this provision and request arrest as a
matter of course, because the obligor's wage earning capacity Ivill
terminate upon his arrest and the whole purpose of proceeding under
the Act will be defeated.
Special provisions. The U.R.E.S.A. contains some important and
desirable provisions that are not found in the U.S.D.A. The Act con-
tains a special provision which permits the disclosure of privileged
communications between husband and wife in any proceeding, mak-
ing husband and wife competent witnesses as to any matter.
0 3
There are two other provisions contained in the Act which serve
to make the proceeding more convenient and expeditious. The first of
these relaxes the technical rules of evidence in any proceeding'" and
the other grants immunity of jurisdiction to parties in any proceeding
other than those under the Act.'
65
Reimbursement proceedings by the state. Probably the most im-
portant provision in the Act not contained in the U.S.D.A. is that which
provides that whenever a state or political sub-division has furnished
support to an obligee, it may invoke the provisions of the Act for the
purpose of securing reimbursement of expenditures made.166 Under
this provision, the state may thus recoup some of the money spent by
it on families receiving public welfare. In many instances, dependents
will not know that they can obtain support from their out-of-state
husbands or fathers. In other instances, they may think it easier to
' House Bill 809, sec. 15 (1954).
" House Bill 809, sec. 25 (1954).
' House Bill 809, sec. 26 (1954).
' House Bill 809, sec. 28 (1954).
'a House Bill 809, sec. 8 (1954).
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continue receiving support money out of public funds. The ease with
which one may be placed on public relief rolls many times enables one
to actually work a fraud on the state. 67 Under this provision of the
Act, the burden on taxpayers can be lessened and possibly diminished
altogether by compelling the dependent to assist the state in seeking
reimbursement under penalty of forfeiture of public assistance if he
refuses. Since the state or welfare agency can obtain the help of other
states in locating the deserter, there is some indication that such pro-
ceedings will prove to be highly successful. Although the petitioner
need not attend the hearing in the responding state, it might be
advantageous if some representative of he state appeared when the
state is seeking reimbursement for the amount paid out of its welfare
fund.
Some states hold that a cause of action does not accrue in favor of
the county or state welfare department against the relative failing to
furnish support to the dependent until he is directed to do so by a
court order.16  In these states, the effect of the reimbursement pro-
vision of the Act will be drastically limited and it is possible that in
some cases, the section will be entirely useless since the proceeding
cannot be brought when one of these states is a responding state.
However, many states allow subrogation and reimbursement proceed-
ings by the state or county without prior determination of liability and
a court order for support. 69 Kentucky's statute170 allows the Depart-
ment of Welfare to obtain reimbursement from the relatives of a
patient, from the estate of the deceased patient and from the husband,
wife or parent of any such patient. It is not necessary under the
statute that the party be liable for such support under a decree of the
court.' 7 ' Such a reimbursement provision as that contained in the
U.R.E.S.A. is thus mechanically operative in Kentucky.
This writer has before him a new paper clipping from a small county news-
paper, relating the instance where one o5 our Circuit Judges sentenced a husband
to thirty days in jail so that . . . his wife would be eligible for relief money."
' Howard County v. Enevoldson, 118 Neb. 222, 224 N.W. 280 (1929);
Multowmah County v. Feling, 48 Ore. 603, 91 P. 21 (1907); Town of Saxville v.
Bartlett, 126 Wis. 655, 105 N.W. 1052 (1906). See also: Note, 34 MAnQ. L. REV.
34 (1950).
Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Calif. 2d 634, 122 P. 2d 526 (1942).
See: Mni-N. STAT. ANN. sec. 261.02 (1945); N.D. REV. CODE, see. 50.0731 (1943);
VT. STAT. sec. 7128 (1947).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 203.100 (1953): "The department may take all necessary
steps by suit or otherwise to secure from relatives and friends who are liable
therefor or who are willing to assume the cost of support of any person supported
by the state, reimbursement, in whole or in part, of the money expended for the
support of any patient confined or maintained in a state institution." Ky. REv.
STAT. 203.080 (1) (1953) holds the estate of the patient liable for his board and
maintenance and Ky. REv. STAT. 203.080(2) (1953) holds the husband, wife or
parent of any such patient liable for the cost of supporting the patient.a' Dept. of Welfare v. Fox, 240 S.W. 2d (Ky.) 65 (1951); Dept. of Public
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Elimination of fees. Under the new Act, the court when acting
either as initiating or responding state may direct that any part or all
of the fees necessary for a proceeding be eliminated or shall be paid
by the county or by the state and that when a proceeding is brought
by the state for purposes of reimbursement to its welfare fund, there
shall be no filing fee.172 This provision is highly desirable in that pro-
ceedings are usually begun by needy petitioners in destitute circum-
stances or who are already on public welfare rolls and are unable to
pay fees. Requiring the payment of fees and costs may in many in-
stances hamper the effectiveness of the Act. It has been advocated by
various persons and agencies that all fees and costs be eliminated. 73
In ninety per cent of the proceedings, the petitioner will probably be
receiving welfare funds from the state and it may be practically im-
possible for her to pay such fees and costs. However, there will be
cases where the proceeding is brought for the collection of alimony as
separate maintenance when the petitioner will be able to pay the
normal fees. In such instances the court could and should exercise its
discretion so that fees and costs are waived only when the petitioner
is not financially able to pay them.
Miscellaneous provisions. Section 12 of the Act is highly important
in that it allows the person having custody of a minor obligee to file a
petition in his behalf without their appointment as guardian ad litem.
Since the Act supplies a convenient method of collecting support
money for children by a divorced wife, the formality of having the
wife appointed as guardian ad litem of the children before she may
bring suit in their behalf is dispensed with. She may now proceed at
once without waiting until she has incurred the expense of supporting
them.
Section 16 designates the Department of Economic Security as
State Information Agency for the purpose of compiling lists of the
courts and their addresses and transmitting these to the agency of any
other state having a reciprocal act. Provision is made also for the for-
warding of these lists to the courts of every state having jurisdiction
under the Act. This provision is very helpful and provides for more
efficient functioning of the Act since it makes readily accessible an
efficient source of information.
The Act provides for the forwarding of three copies of the petition
Welfare, Com. of Ky. v. Meek, 264 Ky. 771, 95 S.W. 2d 599 (1936); Dept. of
Welfare of Com. of Ky. v. Farmer's Committee, 290 Ky. 813, 162 S.W. 2d 796
(1942).
-House Bill 309, sec. 14 (1954).
' Seaman, Making the Reciprocal Support Law Work, 25 STATE GovT. 132,
135 (1952).
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to the responding state,'7 4 one for the court and one for the repre-
sentative of the petitioner and respondent. The Act also provides for
the sending of a certified copy of the Act to the responding court.
Conclusion
The current trend seems to be toward the adoption of the U.R.E.S.A.
Many states, like Kentucky, which had previously adopted the U.S.D.A.
have since repealed it and substituted the Act promulgated by the
Uniform Law Commission because of its less ambiguous nature, its
easier adaption to existing law, its simpler treatment and many desir-
able provisions not found in the U.S.D.A. Both acts are largely experi-
mental and time will be needed to work out many of the unique
problems presented.17 5 However, time has already indicated that the
U.R.E.S.A. is far more desirable than the U.S.D.A. Little effort was
made to adapt the U.S.D.A. to Kentucky law, it being copied almost
verbatim from the New York Act. Too many duties were placed on the
petitioner's representative and proper attention was not directed to
which court should have jurisdiction. Adoption of the U.R.E.S.A.
leaves such matters to the Legislature and allows better synchroniza-
tion of the Act with existing substantive and procedural law.
With the increasing mobility of our population and the present
practice of husbands and fathers to cross state lines in an effort to
avoid their responsibility of support, some effective remedy is sorely
needed. To shut our eyes to such a practice places a greater burden
on our citizens in the form of increased taxes and increases the demand
for passage of Federal legislation. The problem is one which should
be left entirely to the states for a solution. The states have at last
recognized the need to curb this national evil. The nation-wide move-
ment for a reciprocal inter-state statutory plan has proved most effec-
tive in solving the problem. Such a plan has received unprecedented
acceptance exemplified in the fact that only two states have failed to
adopt such a plan since its inauguration only five years ago. It is hoped
not only that these states will join but also that this plan will eventually
be useful in solving the international problem of non-support. And
"' House Bill 309, sec. 13 (1954).
'The court said in Vincenza v. Vincenza, 197 Misc. 1027, 1035, 98 N.Y.S.
2d 470, 478 that policy considerations "... require careful selectivity in asking
another State to open the doors of its Courts to non-residents of that state under
a novel statute rooted in a concept of comity. Adoption of a come-one-come-all
policy toward petitioners who may turn to the over-publicized new legislation as a
panacea, which, of course, it is not, would doom the experiment to failure. Better,
therefore, to err on the side of circumspection against extending the new law
during the experimental initial stage beyond its primary and original motivation
and to avoid sending to a 'responding state' cases of doubtful merit, such as the
instant proceeding."
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if such a method works in the field of non-support, there is good reason
to believe that it may also work in other fields as well.
APPENDIX
These sample forms taken from the Manual of Procedure, Reciprocal State
Legislation to Enforce the Support of Dependents, published by the Council of
State Governments. A copy of the Manual may be obtained by writing to the
above at 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois. Cost of the manual is $1.00
and should be of great assistance to the practicing attorney. The writer is grate-
ful to the Council for permission to reproduce these suggested forms for use with
any'of the reciprocal support laws and to the assistance received from the Council
in the preparation of this Article.
FORM I
Sample Form of Testimony by Petitioner
STATE OF ........................................
COUNTY OF ......................................
COURT OF ........................................
TESTIMONY OF............................... ..... T S I O Y O
Petitioner
VS ......................................... , Petitioner
................................................ D ocket N o .........
Respondent..................................................................... the Petitioner herein,
(Insert name of petitioner)
being duly sworn, on her oath testifies as follows:
Q. What is your full name?
A.
Q. What is your present address?
A.
Q. When and where were you married to the Respondent? (If petitioner claims
to be the common-law wife of the Respondent, the following should also be
answered.) When did you and Respondent decide to assume the status of
husband and wife? How was the assumption of this status made public?
Where and for what length of time did you and Respondent live together as
husband and wife?
A.
Q. What were the circumstances leading to the separation from your husband?
A.
Q. Are you now pregnant?
A.
Q. What are the names and ages of the children now living?
A.
Q. Are they living with you?
A.
Q. When was it your husband last lived with you?
A.
Q. When and how much was his last contribution for support?
A.
Q. Is there a complaint or an order for support in any court?
A.
Q. Are you employed? What are your earnings?
A.
Q. Have you any other source of income? If so, what is the source and what is
the amount thereof?
A.
Q. Are you and the children in good health?
A.
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Q. Have you any debts outstanding?
A.
Q. What do you require for the support of yourself and children?
A.
Q. Do you know the present whereabouts of your husband? If so, please give his
address.
A.
Q. Do you know if and where your husband is now employed? If so, state:
Name and address of employer and give husband's Social Security number.A.
Q. What is his salary, if you know?
A.
Q. Are you now receiving public aid and how much?
A.
Q. Give an accurate physical description of the Respondent (color of hair, dis-
tinguishing marks, age, etc.), describe other names and aliases by which he is
known and attach a recent photograph or snapshot of the Respondent.
A.
Taken and sworn to before me
this ................ day of ................. 19 ....
Petitioner
Justice of the Court of ....................................................
FORM H
Sample Form of Petition
STATE OF ........................................
COUNTY OF ......................................
COURT OF ........................................
............................................ a in t. ...................................
(Petitioner) g(Respondent)
The petition of ........................................................ respectfully shows:
1. THAT she is the wife of ..................................................... the respondent; that
petitioner was duly married to said respondent on or about (insert date) at
(insert place of marriage) and that her present address ......................................
2. THAT petitioner is the mother and said respondent is the father of the fol-
lowing named dependent(s): (insert names and dates of births of dependents).
3. THAT petitioner and said child(ren) (is) (are) entitled to support from the
respondent under the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act of this state (Chapter ......................... Laws of ............................
copy of which is attached and made a part hereof.
4. THAT respondent, on or about (insert date), and subsequent thereto, refused
and neglected to provide fair and reasonable support for petitioner and the
other dependent(s) according to his means and earning capacity.
5. THAT respondent (was) (is) present in the State of ........................................
during the period for which support is sought.
6. THAT, upon information and belief, respondent's present address is (insert
address and name of state), and that respondent is within the jurisdiction of
the Court of (insert name of Court in responding state), which state has
enacted a law substantially similar to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act of this state.
WHEREFORE, The petitioner prays for such an order for support, directed to
said respondent, as shall be deemed to be fair and reasonable, and for such other
and further relief as the law provides.
............ (........................................................(Petitioner)
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Personally appeared before me (insert name of petitioner) to me personally known
and made oath that she has read the above petition and knows the contents
thereof, and that the same are true of her own knowledge except as to matters
stated on information and belief, and as to these matters she believes them to be
true.
................ °. .................................. ...................
(Clerk of Court)
FORM III
Sample Form of Certificate*
If the certifying Judge has reason to believe that the respondent may leave
the responding state, he may wish to so indicate in the certificate and recommend
that the respondent be brought into Court, if possible, by warrant rather than by
service of process.
STATE OF ........................................
COUNTY OF ....................................
COURT OF ........................................
............................................. ...
Petitioner
vs. Docket Number ......................................
Respondent
The undersigned, a Justice of the Court of ............................................ hereby
certifies:
1. THAT on (insert date) a petition was verified by the above named
petitioner and duly filed in this Court in a proceeding against the above
named respondent commenced under the provisions of the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (Chapter ............. Laws of ................
to compel the support of the dependent(s) named in that petition.
2. THAT the above named respondent is believed to be present in (insert
address and state), and that the Court of (insert name of Court in
responding state) may obtain jurisdiction of the respondent or his property.
3. THAT the undersigned, a Justice of the Court of ................................ has
examined the petitioner under oath and she has reaffirmed the allegations
contained in the petition; and that according to the testimony of the
petitioner the needs of the dependent(s) named in the petition for sup-
port from the respondent are the sum of $ ............................ per (week)
(month).
4. THAT in the opinion of the undersigned Justice the petition sets forth
facts from which it may be determined that the respondent owes a duty
of support and that such petition should be dealt with according to law.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that this certificate together with certified
copies of the jpetition be transmitted to the Court of (insert name of Court in the
responding state).
Justice of the Court of ....................
D ated ................................................ 195....
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